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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
The state appeals from the district court's judgment granting Jaimi
Charboneau's fifth petition for post-conviction relief from his 1986 conviction for
the first-degree murder of his ex-wife, Marilyn Arbaugh. In this case Charboneau
claimed that in 2011 a prison guard handed him an envelope containing several
documents. The documents included a copy of a letter allegedly written by Tira
Arbaugh, the victim's daughter and a witness at his criminal trial, which
Charboneau alleged substantiated the claims he had asserted in his third petition
for post-conviction relief. Charboneau claimed other documents in the envelope
established the state's efforts to keep him from obtaining this letter from 1989 on,
although most of these documents were proved to be forgeries. The district court
nevertheless found that prison personnel had suppressed the letter from 2003 to
2011, and on that basis granted Charboneau a new trial in his criminal case.
The state appeals the judgment, asserting that the district court erred by
(1) finding that the statute of limitations did not bar the claim even though the
same claim was found to be time-barred in Charboneau's third petition; (2)
concluding that three documents, including two written by persons who died
before this case was initiated, were admissible hearsay; (3) finding that
suppression of evidence by prison personnel years after completion of the
criminal trial was a Brady violation that prejudiced Charboneau's criminal trial; (4)
explicitly considering inadmissible evidence excluded at the evidentiary hearing
in making its ruling; and (5) admitting evidence of prior bad acts to show actions
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in conformity with character.

Because of its long involvement in the underlying

criminal and related post-conviction cases the state requests that this case be
retained by the Idaho Supreme Court.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
I.

The Criminal Case
A. The Charges And Pre-trial Proceedings
The state filed a complaint charging Charboneau with first-degree

kidnapping and grand theft for abducting his ex-wife, Marilyn Arbaugh, and
stealing her car on June 21, 1984. (#16339 R., vol. I, pp. 1-3.) Shortly thereafter
the state filed a complaint charging him with the July 1, 1984 first-degree murder
of Marilyn. (#16339 R., vol. I, p. 4.)
The case proceeded to preliminary hearing where Marilyn's oldest
daughter, Tiffnie Arbaugh, was called as a witness by the state. (P.H. Tr., vol. 1,
p. 81, Ls. 1-3. 1) The victim's youngest daughter, Tira Arbaugh, was called by the
defense. (P.H. Tr., vol. 2, p. 282, Ls. 21-23.) Both Tira and Tiffnie testified that
on the morning of the murder they were awakened when their mother, Marilyn,
returned home at around 10:30 or 11 :00. (P.H. Tr., vol. 1, p. 87, Ls. 7-21; P.H.
Tr., vol. 2, p. 285, L. 5 - p. 287, L. 16.) Their mother had brought them some
magazines that they looked at together. (P.H. Tr., vol. 1, p. 88, L. 24 - p. 89, L.
9; P.H. Tr., vol. 2, p. 287, L. 17 - p. 288, L. 2.) Marilyn then took a bath. (P.H.
Tr., vol. 1, p. 89, Ls. 10-15; P.H. Tr., vol. 2, p. 288, Ls. 1-16.) After her bath,

The preliminary hearing and trial transcripts from the underlying criminal case
are part of the record in docket no. 16339, and are cited, respectively, as "P.H.
Tr." and "Trial Tr."
1
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Marilyn went out to the phone, located in a shop near the house, to call her
parents, while Tira got in the bath. (P.H. Tr., vol. 1, p. 89, L. 21 - p. 90, L. 16;
P.H. Tr., vol. 2, p. 288, L. 20 - p. 289, L. 7.) Marilyn returned about ten minutes
later, asking if the girls had turned the horses out into the corral. (P.H. Tr., vol. 1,
p. 89, Ls. 23-24; p. 91, Ls. 6-25; P.H. Tr., vol. 2, p. 289, Ls. 14-23.) She then
went back out to put the horses back. (P.H. Tr., vol. 1, p. 93, Ls. 2-4; P.H. Tr.,
vol. 2, p. 297, L. 24 - p. 298, L. 4.)
Shortly after Marilyn left the house to move the horses, Tiffnie heard shots
and both Tira and Tiffnie heard their mother scream. (P.H. Tr., vol. 1, p. 93, Ls.
5-17, p. 95, Ls. 16-24; P.H. Tr., vol. 2, p. 298, Ls. 5-25.) Tiffnie grabbed her
mother's .22 pistol and ran outside to investigate. (P.H. Tr., vol. 1, p. 96, L. 4 - p.
97, L. 8; P.H. Tr., vol. 2, p. 298, L. 17 - p. 299, L. 21.) She found Charboneau
with a .22 rifle in his hands, standing over her mother, who was sitting on the
ground and bleeding. (P.H. Tr., vol. 1, p. 97, L. 9 - p. 99, L. 19; p. 112, L. 22 - p.
113, L. 1.) Charboneau told Tiffnie to leave, and that he would take Marilyn to
the doctor. (P.H. Tr., vol. 1, p. 99, Ls. 20-23.) Tiffnie called the police. (P.H. Tr.,
vol. 1, p. 100, Ls. 22-25.) She then ran to get Tira out of the bath. (P.H. Tr., vol.
1, p. 101, Ls. 8-19; P.H. Tr., vol. 2, p. 299, L. 24 - p. 300, L. 20.) While Tira
dressed, Tiffnie hid the keys to the pickup in the freezer to make sure
Charboneau could not get them and escape. (P.H. Tr., vol. 1, p. 101, L. 16 - p.
102, L. 7.)

Moments later, while both girls dressed, they heard more shots.

(P.H. Tr., vol.1, p. 102, L. 16-p.103, L. 4; P.H. Tr., vol. 2, p. 302, L. 10-p.
303, L. 9; p. 327, L. 16 - p. 328, L. 19.)
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Both girls went back out and hid behind a sheep wagon. (P.H. Tr., vol. 1,
p. 103, Ls.

; P.H. Tr., vol 2, p 300, L. 22 - p. 301, L. 4.) They called out to

their mother. (P.H. Tr., vol. 1, p. 103, Ls. 10-23; P.H. Tr., vol. 2, p. 301, Ls. 7-9.)
Tiffnie accidentally discharged the .22 pistol, and then took it back inside the
house. (P.H. Tr., vol. 1, p. 103, L. 24 - p. 104, L. 6; P.H. Tr., vol. 2, p. 303, L. 12
- p. 304, L. 12.) The girls went to the barn and found their mother lying there
dead. (P.H. Tr., vol. 1, p. 104, L. 7-p. 107, L. 20.)
The magistrate bound Charboneau over on all charges, and the state filed
informations

charging first-degree

murder

in

one

case and

first-degree

kidnapping and grand theft in another. (#16339 R., vol. I, pp. 76-83.) The cases
were consolidated for trial. (#16339 R., vol. I, pp. 111-12; #16339 Supp. Tr., vol.
I, p. 48, Ls. 3-12.)
Charboneau filed a motion to dismiss and testified in support of that
motion. (#16339 R., vol. II, pp. 339-342; #16339 Supp. Tr., p. 102, L. 1 - p. 325,
L. 18.) He testified he purchased a .22 rifle, two boxes of shells, and some gift
wrap to present the rifle to Tira as a gift. (#16339 Supp. Tr., p. 137, L. 15 - p.
139, L. 7.)

He then went out to the ranch where Marilyn and the girls lived.

(#16339 Supp. Tr., p. 140, L. 3-p. 141, L. 7.) He claimed he lived in the tack
shed on the property for the next three days prior to the murder, with Marilyn's
permission, because Marilyn was waiting for the right time to tell the girls about
her and Charboneau's reconciliation. (#16339 Supp. Tr., p. 140, L. 24 - p. 151,

L. 14.) Charboneau testified that Marilyn made the decision to tell the girls of the
reconciliation on Sunday morning and also decided to give Tira the rifle
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Charboneau purchased.

(#16339 Supp. Tr., p. 151, L. 12 - p. 152, L. 22.)

Charboneau testified that Marilyn took the rifle into the house and returned a few
minutes later with the rifle, but without the scope that had been on it. (#16339
Supp. Tr., p. 152, L. 23 - p. 153, L. 10.) As Charboneau put on his boots, she
loaded the rifle. (#16339 Supp. Tr., p. 153, Ls. 10-22.)
According to Charboneau, when he asked Marilyn where she had spent
the previous night she announced she could not "take it," told him she loved him,
but that she could not live with or without him. (#16339 Supp. Tr., p. 153, L. 23 p. 154, L. 13.) She pointed the rifle at him and said, "You're dead. No other
woman is going to have you." (#16339 Supp. Tr., p. 154, Ls. 14-16.) She pulled
the trigger but the gun did not fire. (#16339 Supp. Tr., p. 154, Ls. 16-19.)
Charboneau testified that he then wrestled the rifle away from Marilyn
while Marilyn screamed at Tiffnie to get "Rufus," her shotgun. (#16339 Supp. Tr.,
p. 154, L. 20 - p. 155, L. 7.) Once Charboneau had the .22 rifle, Marilyn ran
toward the house. (#16339 Supp. Tr., p. 155, Ls. 7-9.) Tiffnie exited the house
with the .22 pistol. (#16339 Supp. Tr., p. 155, Ls. 9-11.) Charboneau testified
that at that point he closed his eyes and the rifle in his hands just "went off ...
four or five times." (#16339 Supp. Tr., p. 155, Ls.11-16.)
Charboneau claimed he opened his eyes and saw Marilyn bleeding from
her shoulder and leg.

(#16339 Supp. Tr., p. 155, Ls. 17-25.) He knelt down

beside her and she apologized for "all the lies" she had told him. (#16339 Supp.
Tr., p. 156, Ls. 1-6.) Charboneau testified that at that moment Tiffnie ran at them
and shot "two or three times." (#16339 Supp. Tr., p. 156, Ls. 7-11.) Assuming
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she was shooting at him, he fled.

(#16339 Supp. Tr., p. 156, Ls. 10-19.) He

came back, however, and saw Tiffnie shoot Marilyn one time. (#16339 Supp. Tr.,
p. 156, L. 20 - p. 157, L. 11.) When Tiffnie left the scene he retrieved the rifle
and fled to a nearby field. (#16339 Supp. Tr., p. 157, L. 12 - p. 158, L. 11.)
The district court denied the motion to dismiss on November 27, 1984.
(#16339 R., vol. II, pp. 437-38.) Shortly after denial of the motion to dismiss, the
district court appointed Deputy Attorney General Marc Haws as special
prosecutor. (#16339 R., vol. 11, pp. 452-53.)
B. The Trial
At the criminal trial the state presented the following evidence:
On June 22, 1984, Marilyn Arbaugh fled out the hatchback of her car on a
rural road to escape her ex-husband, Jaime Charboneau, who had abducted her
after work the previous day and refused to take her home. (Trial Tr., vol. 1., p.
50, L. 5 - p. 68, L. 20; p. 74, L. 5 - p. 85, L. 5; see also, p. 196, L. 20 - p. 205, L.
8; p. 231, L. 13 - p. 242, L. 23; vol. 2, p. 260, L. 8 - p. 266, L. 7.) Charboneau
had choked Marilyn unconscious and she had bruising on her head, neck and
breast. (Trial Tr., vol. 1, p. 94, L. 5-p. 103, L. 2; p. 150, L. 21 -p. 151, L. 24; p.
155, L. 24 - p. 156, L. 22.) The Sherriff's office put out an alert for Charboneau
and the car, and a judge issued an arrest warrant. (Trial Tr., vol. 1, p. 151, L. 25
-p.157,L.11.)
After Marilyn fled from the car, Charboneau went to a casino in Nevada.
(Trial Tr., vol. 5, p. 1231, L. 2 - p. 1232, L. 10.) Police later discovered Marilyn's
briefcase, which she always carried in her car and which contained important
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papers, discarded near that casino. (Trial Tr., vol. 1, p. 108, L. 7 - p. 119, L. 6; p.
122, L. 5 - p. 130, L. 8; p. 143, L. 2- p. 145, L. 1.)
On June 26, 1984, south of Mountain Home, witnesses saw Charboneau
in possession of the backpack Marilyn used as a purse. (Trial Tr., vol. 2, p. 290,
L.22 - p. 293, L. 17; p. 365, L. 7 - p. 368, L. 21.) Charboneau was using the
name "Sam," claiming he worked for the government, and claiming at different
times he was walking because (1) his truck had recently run out of gas, (2) his
horse had gotten loose after being spooked by a rattlesnake, or (3) he shot his
horse because it was bitten by a rattlesnake. (Trial Tr., vol. 2, p. 378, L. 14 - p.
386, L. 23; p. 401, L. 24 - p. 419, L. 2; vol. 3, p. 506, L. 4 - p. 510, L. 20; p. 514,

L. 25 - p. 526, L. 11.) The next day, June 27, 1984, Marilyn's burned out car
(minus VIN plate and license plates) was found in the same area where
Charboneau was hitchhiking, and tracks consistent with Charboneau's boots
were all around it. (Trial Tr., vol. 2, p. 420, L. 2 - p. 441, L. 25; p. 451, L. 7 - p.
470, L. 17.)
Charboneau got a ride to Hagerman on June 27, 1984. (Trial Tr., vol. 3, p.
p. 514, L. 25 - p. 526, L. 11.)

That same day he tried to buy a .22 caliber

Remington rifle from the local hardware store, completing the transaction (and
also buying two boxes of ammunition) on the 28 th when the store owners brought
the gun in from their other store in Gooding. (Trial Tr., vol. 3, p. 534, L. 24 - p.
542, L. 19; p. 554, L. 2 - p. 560, L. 1; p. 572, L. 17 - p. 573, L. 7; p. 575, L. 9 - p.
576, L. 12.) The Remington rifle held up to fifteen bullets at a time and was easy
to reload. (Trial Tr., vol. 4, p. 859, Ls. 23-25; vol. 5, p. 1169, L. 14 - p. 1170, L.
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2; p. 1171, L. 24 - p. 1172, L. 19.) Charboneau claimed he was working in the
desert and needed the Remington Rifle to kill rattlesnakes. (Trial

, vol. 3, p.

556, Ls. 2-5; p. 559, L. 24 - p. 560, L. 1; p. 573, L. 22 - p. 574, L. 6.)
Charboneau had threatened Marilyn in April of 1984, telling her that if he
could not have her no man could. (Trial Tr., vol. 2, p. 327, L. 15 - p. 331, L. 20;
vol. 5, p. 1247, L. 13 - p. 1250, L. 3.) On the day immediately preceding the
murder, Marilyn repeatedly expressed her fear of Charboneau. (Trial Tr., vol. 2,
p. 260, L. 20 - p. 262, L. 24; p. 331, L. 21 - p. 337, L. 21.)
On July 1, 1984, the day of the murder, Marilyn arrived home at about
10:00 to 10:30 in the morning, having spent the night out on a date. (Trial Tr.,
vol. 3, p. 614, L. 9 - p. 620, L. 20; p. 701, L. 3 - p. 702, L. 1; vol. 6, p. 1252, L. 14
- p. 1261, L. 11.) She took a bath and got dressed. (Trial Tr., vol. 3, p. 620, L.
21 - p. 623, L. 5; vol. 6, p. 1261, Ls. 12-16; p. 1262, Ls. 1-18.) She left the
house and went to the shed (where the phone was) and called her father at
11 :30 a.m. to ask if he had heard from the Sherriff's office regarding its search for
Charboneau, something she did every time she came home because she did not
have a phone in her house, and she was scared of Charboneau. (Trial Tr., vol.
3, p. 587, L. 24 - p. 590, L. 4; p. 623, Ls. 6-22; vol. 6, p. 1261, Ls. 15-16.) When
she returned she asked her daughters, Tira and Tiffnie, if either of them had
turned loose the horses. (Trial Tr., vol. 3, p. 623, L. 6 - p. 625, L. 6; p. 637, L. 13
- p. 638, L. 3; vol. 6, p. 1262, L. 19 - p. 1263, L. 15.) She then left the house
again to corral the horses. (Trial Tr., vol. 3, p. 638, Ls. 4-23.)
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Shortly after Marilyn left the house, Charboneau shot her and she
screamed. (Trial Tr., vol. 3, p. 638, L. 24 - p. 640,

4.) Her daughter Tiffnie

grabbed her mother's pistol and went out to the barn. (Trial Tr., vol. 3, p. 640, Ls.
5-20; vol. 6, p. 1263, L. 16 - p. 1264, L. 20.) In the barn, in an alleyway between
corrals, Tiffnie saw her mother sitting on the ground with Charboneau standing
over her pointing a rifle at her. (Trial Tr., vol. 3, p. 640, L. 18 - p. 642, L. 16.)
Marilyn had a hand to one shoulder, staunching a flow of blood, and she was
also bleeding from one leg. (Trial Tr., vol. 3, p. 641, Ls. 7-25.) Both Charboneau
and Marilyn told Tiffnie to leave. (Trial Tr., vol. 3, p. 643, L. 4 - p. 644, L. 3.)
Tiffnie ran to the shop, called the police, and reported that Charboneau
had shot her mother. (Trial Tr., vol. 3, p. 644, Ls. 4-7.) The dispatcher described
her as "very hysterical, crying, screaming into the phone." (Trial Tr., vol. 3, p.
734, L. 18 - p. 737, L. 3.) Tiffnie then ran back to the house, got Tira out of the
bath, and they both dressed. (Trial Tr., vol. 3, p. 644, Ls. 8-19; vol. 6, p. 1264, L.
21 - p. 1265, L. 24.) As they got dressed they heard more shots. (Trial Tr., vol.
3, p. 644, L. 20 - p. 645, L. 6; vol. 6, p. 1267, L. 3 - p. 1268, L. 25; p. 1303, Ls.
21-24.)

The sisters left the house together and eventually entered the barn

where they saw their mother's body. (Trial Tr., vol. 3, p. 645, L. 7 - p. 662, L. 21;
vol. 6, p. 1269, L. 1 - p. 1270, L. 17.) Marilyn's shirt had been pulled down to
expose her left breast. (Trial Tr., p. 663, Ls. 2-7.)
Tira called for an ambulance. (Trial Tr., vol. 3, p. 662, Ls. 22-24; vol. 6, p.
1270, Ls. 17-25.) She was hysterical and reported that "Jamie [sic] had a gun"
and had gone out the back way. (Trial Tr., vol. 3, p. 738, L. 21 - p. 740, L. 3.)
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Charboneau was arrested a short distance away not long after police were
dispatched. (Trial Tr., vol. 4, p.751, L. 6 - p. 766,, L. 17; p. 881, L. 1 - p. 886, L.
12.) After being informed he was under arrest for murder, Charboneau claimed
he killed Marilyn because she would have shot him and she had shot him once
before, and indicated where he had thrown the rifle. (Trial Tr., vol. 4, p. 766, L.
18 - p. 769, L. 24; p. 886, L. 13 - p. 889, L. 4.) The Remington rifle Charboneau
had purchased on June 28 was found nearby. (Trial Tr., p. 796, L. 18 - p. 798,

L. 14; p. 892, Ls. 14-24; p. 895, L. 2 - p. 899, L. 19.) There was blood on the
end of the barrel from "blowback type splatter." (Trial Tr., vol. 4, p. 898, Ls. 1023; p. 901, Ls. 2-24.)
The floor of the alleyway in the barn was covered by approximately three
inches of hay stems and clippings and manure on top of dirt. (Trial Tr., vol. 4, p.
772, L. 1 - p. 773, L. 6.) Several officers and others were in that area during the
investigation. (Trial Tr., vol. 4, p. 773, L. 7 - p. 780, L. 3.) Officers found seven
spent Remington .22 caliber bullet casings in the barn. (Trial Tr., vol. 4, p. 780,
Ls. 4-8; p. 784, L. 2 - p. 796, L. 17; p. 934, L. 9 - p. 945, L. 17. 2 ) Marilyn's
backpack, the same one Charboneau possessed after Marilyn fled from him, was
found in the cellar by the barn; among the items in the backpack were the boxes
of shells Charboneau purchased in Hagerman, one full and one only partly full.
(Trial Tr., vol. 4, p. 800, L. 9 - p. 807, L. 3; p. 980, L. 19 - p. 998, L. 7.)

Another .22 casing was found near the sheep wagon; although it was
photographed, and the photograph admitted into evidence, the casing was not
retained as evidence. (Trial Tr., vol. 4, p. 906, L. 24 - p. 916, L. 13.)

2
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Autopsies on Marilyn's body revealed between 14 and 17 entrance
wounds, assuming no ricochets to bring the number even lower. (Trial Tr., vol. 5,
p. 1040, Ls. 16-20; p. 1083, L. 14 - p. 1086, L. 5.) There were four entrance
wounds in her right upper mid-chest that appeared to have been inflicted at long
range (greater than two and one-half feet), and would have been fatal wounds.
(Trial Tr., vol. 5, p. 1044, L. 1 - p. 1050, L. 12; p. 1055, L. 2 - p. 1056, L. 19; p.
1063, L. 1 - p. 1064, L. 9; p. 1068, Ls. 12-18.)

A fifth entrance wound was

directly under the left breast, and was produced by putting the muzzle of the rifle
directly against the skin under the breast before firing. (Trial Tr., vol. 5, p. 1050,
L. 13- p. 1054, L. 23; p. 1068, Ls. 12-18; p. 1166, L. 7-p. 1167, L. 11.) A sixth
entrance wound in the upper left chest corresponded with an exit wound, and
was in the nature of a flesh wound that would not have been fatal. (Trial Tr., vol.
5, p. 1066, Ls. 1-18.) A seventh entrance wound in the lower abdomen was also
long range and corresponded with an exit wound. (Trial Tr., vol. 5, p. 1069, L. 15
- p. 1070, L. 12.) There were three entrance wounds in the thigh, two of which
exited and one of which broke the femur.

(Trial Tr., vol. 5, p. 1071, L. 13 - p.

1075, L. 18.) Another entrance wound was in an ankle. (Trial Tr., vol. 5, p. 1075,
L. 19 - p. 1077, L. 10.) There was an entrance wound in the left calf, and the
bullet was recovered.

(Trial Tr., vol. 5, p. 1080, Ls. 2-19.)

Entrance and exit

wounds were found in the right hand, indicating that the same bullet may have
caused another of the entrance wounds if it passed through the hand and
entered the body. (Trial Tr., vol. 5, p. 1077, L. 11 - p. 1080, L. 1.) Marilyn had
also been shot in the back of the left shoulder (Trial Tr., vol. 5, p. 1080, L. 20 - p.
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1081, L. 12) and in the back of the neck with the bullet exiting beneath her left
ear (Trial Tr., vol. 5, p. 1081, L. 13 -p. 1082, L. 22).
There were seven bullets found in Marilyn's body: all were Remingtons,
five were definitely fired through the Remington nylon stock rifle Charboneau
purchased on June 28, one was mangled too much for sure identification, but the
possibility the last was fired from another weapon was "remote" or "slight." (Trial
Tr., vol. 5, p. 1128, L. 3- p. 1151, L. 12; p. 1177, L. 4- p. 1179, L. 19. 3) The
shell casings were also identified as having being shot by the Remington. (Trial
Tr., vol. 5, p. 1151, L. 25 - p. 1157, L. 6.) Tests on the pants Charboneau was
wearing and the Remington rifle were both positive for blood of Marilyn's type but
not for Charboneau's. (Trial Tr., vol. 5, p. 1200, L. 16

p. 1208, L. 23; p. 1216,

L. 14 - p. 1218, L. 4.)

The trial judge dismissed the kidnapping and grand theft charges on the
basis that the state failed to prove venue. (Trial Tr., vol. 6, p. 1347, Ls. 4-13.)
The jury found Charboneau guilty of first-degree murder. (#16339 R., vol. IV, pp.
1035-38.)

C. Sentencing And Judgment
The case proceeded to a capital sentencing hearing, after which the
district court imposed the death penalty. (#16339 R., vol. V, pp. 1230-44.) The
district court entered judgment on January 28, 1986.

(#16339 R., vol. V, p.

1243.)

Compositional analysis apparently also confirmed that the bullets in Marilyn's
body came from the same batch as the bullets in the Remington box Charboneau
purchased. (Trial Tr., vol. 6, p. 1308, L. 6 - p. 1309, L. 5; State's Exhibit 122.)

3

12

II.

The First Post-Conviction Case
Based on Idaho's unitary review for capital cases, Charboneau filed

a

petition for post-conviction relief 42 days after entry of judgment in the criminal
case. (#16339 Supp. R., pp. 1-15.) He asserted claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel for allowing Charboneau to be interviewed by the state's investigator;
calling Charboneau as a witness in support of the motion to dismiss; moving to
combine the murder and the kidnapping cases for trial; failing to get a
psychological evaluation of Charboneau prior to trial; failing to adequately advise
Charboneau prior to undertaking the previously listed actions; being ignorant of
the prejudice that would come from the previously listed actions; and failing to
move for a new trial.

(#16339 Supp. R., pp. 2-3, 6-8.)

numerous claims of trial error.

He also asserted

(#16339 Supp. R., pp. 8-11.)

Finally, he

challenged the constitutionality of the death penalty, generally and as applied in
his case. (#16339 Supp. R., pp. 11-14.) After an evidentiary hearing the district
court denied the petition. (#16339 Supp. R., pp. 203-10.) On December 8, 1986,
Charboneau filed a notice of appeal from both the criminal judgment and the
post-conviction ruling.

(#16339 Supp. R., pp. 231-34.)

Marc Haws' last

appearance as special prosecutor was shortly thereafter, on December 16,
1986. 4 (#16741 R., vol. I, pp. 155-56.)

This corresponds to when Haws left the Attorney General's office for a job in
Salt Lake City before returning to Idaho a little less than a year later to become
an Assistant United States Attorney. (Evid. Tr., p. 430, L. 25 - p. 431, L. 23.)
4
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111.

The Second Post-Conviction Action
Charboneau filed his second petition for post-conviction relief, making

additional claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, on February 20, 1987.
(#16339 R., augmentation, pp. 119-31.)

The district court appointed Deputy

Attorney General Peter Erbland as special prosecutor, replacing Haws, on April
28, 1987.

(#16741 R., vol. II, pp. 155-56.)

The second petition and related

motions were denied on May 19, 1987. (#16339 R., augmentation, pp. 206-08.)
Charboneau thereafter filed an amended notice of appeal to include the second
post-conviction action in the previously filed appeal. (#16339 R., augmentation,
pp. 212-15.)

IV.

The First Appeal
On appeal the Idaho Supreme Court first gave a general accounting of the

facts of the crimes. State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 132-33, 774 P.2d 299,
302-03 (1989). It noted that Charboneau had given two very different accounts
of the shooting to his attorney:
Initially, Jaimi told the defense attorney that on the morning
of July 1, 1984, Marilyn had taken the .22 caliber rifle he had
purchased for Tira into the house to remove a scope sight from it.
He said that when she returned to the barn she loaded the rifle,
pointed it at Jaimi, and pulled the trigger, but that it did not fire.
Jaimi told the defense attorney that he grabbed the rifle from
Marilyn and pulled the trigger several times while the rifle was on
his hip and Marilyn was running away. He said that he closed his
eyes while shooting. He said that after the shooting he took the
rifle and fled to the nearby field.
Later, but prior to August 22, 1984, Jaimi told the defense
attorney that after he fired the shots at Marilyn, instead of running
directly out into the field, he had stayed around the end of the barn.
He told the defense attorney that he heard Tiffnie talking to her
14

mother and had looked around the corner. He said he saw Tiffnie
holding a pistol in both hands pointed at Marilyn. Jaimi said that
Tiffnie told Marilyn that Marilyn had screwed up their lives, ruined
Tira's life, and was ruining Jaimi. He stated that he saw Tiffnie fire
a shot from the pistol and saw Marilyn's hair fly up.

kl at 134, 774

P.2d at 304.

The Court concluded that Charboneau had not been denied the right to
effective assistance of counsel. Id. at 137-41, 774 P.2d at 307-11. The Court
also found no trial error.

kl at

141-44, 774 P.2d at 311-14. The Court found no

error in the conduct of the post-conviction proceedings.
at 314-15.

kl

at 144-45, 774 P.2d

It did find error in the sentencing, however, and vacated the death

sentence and remanded for a new sentencing.

kl

at 145-54, 77 4 P .2d at 315-

24.
The Idaho Supreme Court issued its opinion on April 4, 1989, denied
rehearing on May 25, 1989, and issued its remittitur the same day.

kl

at 129,

774 P.2d at 299. The Supreme Court of the United States denied Charboneau's
petition for certiorari on October 16, 1989. Charboneau v. Idaho, 493 U.S. 922
(1989).

V.

Proceedings On Remand And The Second Appeal
After the criminal case was remanded to the district court, the state was

initially represented by Jerome County Prosecutor John Horgan, who made his
first appearance on August 15, 1989.

(#19635/19973 R., pp. 103-04)

On

February 22, 1990, the district court appointed Keith Roark as special prosecutor.
(#19635/19973 R., p. 126) In August 1991, the state withdrew its intention to
seek the death penalty.

(#19635/19973 R., pp. 609-11.)
15

The district court

entered judgment on a fixed life sentence on October 15, 1991. (#19635/19973
R., pp. 621-22.) The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. State v. Charboneau, 124
Idaho 497, 861 P.2d 67 (1993). 5

VI.

The Third Post-Conviction Case
Charboneau filed his third petition for post-conviction relief on May 23,

2002. (#29042 R., p. 5.) His claims were based on two things: First, on a letter
allegedly written by Larry Gold, former Jerome County Sheriff, 6 received by
Charboneau on June 5, 2001. (#29042 R., p. 8.) Second, on a claim that "[o]ver
the years since the tragic death of Marilyn Arbaugh her daughter 'Tira' had
discussed the subject of her personal knowledge regarding certain facts about
the day of the shooting with Betsy Charboneau/Crabtree" and told her "she had
been instructed to remain silent about her knowledge." (#29042 R., pp. 23-24.)
Betsy Charboneau-Crabtree filed an affidavit stating that Tira told her "that the
tragedy which took the life of her mother on July 1st, 1984 did not happen the way
it played out in court."

(#29042 R., p. 53.)

She stated that Tira told her that

prosecutors Dan Adamson and Marc Haws and sheriff's deputy Larry Webb "did
instruct her on what they wanted her to say regarding the events which took
place on July 1st, 1984," and that Marc Haws and state's investigator Gary Carr

After failing to obtain relief in state courts, Charboneau filed for federal habeas
corpus relief, but his petition was denied. Charboneau v. Klauser, 107 F.3d 15
(9 th Cir. 1997) (unpublished).
··

5

Gold was not the sheriff at the time of the murder or trial (Trial Tr., vol. 6, p.
1393, Ls. 6-17) and had no connection to the investigation of Marilyn's murder or
the prosecution of Charboneau.
6
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"instructed her not to reveal certain facts about things which were found at the
scene of the shooting," including "her mother's holster and, her mother's guns."
(#29042 R., p. 53 (underlining and comma original).)

According to Ms.

Charboneau-Crabtree, Tira was "willing to testify in court" but "tragically ...
passed away recently(] ... before she had a chance to testify."

(#29042 R., p.

54.)
The district court dismissed the petition as untimely. (#29042 R., pp. 9092.) The Idaho Supreme Court reversed, with two justices dissenting, 8 finding
error in failing to rule on Charboneau's request for counsel prior to dismissing.
Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 102 P .3d 1108 (2004 ).
On remand, the district court appointed counsel. (#32120 R., pp. 22-23.)
The district court, on July 12, 2005, summarily dismissed the petition as untimely
and unsupported by admissible evidence (because the evidence was hearsay).
(#32120 R., pp. 43-64.)

The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed.

Charboneau v.

State, 144 Idaho 900, 174 P.3d 870 (2007).

7

Tira had passed away almost four years previously, in 1998. (Exhibit D.)

The dissenting justices would have found the claims frivolous because they
were based on hearsay. Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 794-96, 102 P.3d
1108, 113-15 (2004).
8
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VI I.

The Present Case
Charboneau filed his fifth 9 petition for post-conviction relief on June 15,

2011 (R., vol. 1, pp. 20-24), and his appointed counsel filed an amended petition
about four months later (R., vol. 1, pp. 134-40).

In the Amended Petition,

Charboneau alleged that on March 18, 2011, he was provided an envelope with
several documents.

(R., vol. 1, pp. 136-37.)

These documents, he alleged,

showed that Tira Arbaugh had given false testimony at the trial at the behest of
prosecutors and that prosecutors had also concealed physical evidence. (R., vol.
1, pp. 138-39.)

Charboneau alleged that other documents in the envelope

showed a conspiracy or conspiracies involving prison paralegal DeWayne
Shedd, prison guard William Unger, former prosecutor Marc Haws, Deputy
Attorney General Tim McNeese, and court clerk Cheryl Watts to keep him from
getting the letters allegedly written by Tira Arbaugh and Larry Gold. (R., vol. 1,
pp. 139-40.)
The document primarily relied on to support Charboneau's claims is a
multigenerational copy of a document allegedly written by Tira.

(R., vol. 1, pp.

158-64 (later introduced into evidence as Exhibit 14).) In this document the
declarant claims that (1) when writing her statement police officers told her to
fabricate the time she woke up (R., vol. 1, p. 159); (2) she now remembers that
her sister, and not her mother, is the one that "said something about the horses"
and Marilyn asked Jaimi to go out and check on them "after [Marilyn] woke up

Charboneau's fourth petition was filed on February 4, 2008, and dismissed
shortly thereafter, and his appeal was also dismissed. (Supreme Court docket
35193.)
9
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that morning" (R., vol. 1, pp. 159-60); (3) before Jaimi left the house he
commented on her oversleeping and her mother gave her "a new .22 rifle" in a
wrapped box (R., vol. 1, p. 160); (4) Marilyn then took a bath, dressed and went
outside to help Jaimi with the horses (R., vol.1, p. 160); (5) she told an officer she
was in the bath when she heard Marilyn scream for Tiff, and a few seconds later
heard gunshots (R., vol. 1, pp. 160-61); (6) she got out of the bath and she and
Tiff went outside, she armed with her mother's pistol and Tiff taking the new rifle
(R., vol. 1, p. 161); (7) they went behind the sheep wagon and Tiff fired the rifle
into the barn (R., vol. 1, p. 161 ); (8) Tiff told her that Marilyn had taken a different
.22 rifle with her when she went to help with the horses, but the officer told her it
was not necessary to include this in her statement (R., vol. 1, pp. 161-62); (9)
another officer told her to add a statement to her report that she later heard
additional shots (R., vol. 1, p. 162); and (10) on the instructions of Marc Haws her
family got rid of the .22 rifle Marilyn had been carrying that day, which they did
"last week" (R., vol. 1, pp. 162-63). The format of the document is a letter to
Judge Becker and is dated September 6, 1989. (R., vol. 1, pp. 158, 164.)
The other exhibits presented as support for the petition included a
document labelled "sworn statement" allegedly signed by former Jerome County
Sheriff Larry Gold, which claims that Gold's Chief Deputy, Mito Alanzo [sic] told
him he had seen a letter by Tira Arbaugh in the hands of court clerk Cheryl Watts
(R., vol. 1, pp. 148-49 (later introduced as Exhibit 8)); a document purportedly
signed by former Jerome County Deputy Orville Balzer saying he had seen "a
letter from Tira Arbaugh ... addressed to Judge Phillip Becker" in the possession
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of Watts (R., vol. 1, p. 154 (later introduced as Exhibit 5)); a document allegedly
written by prison paralegal DeWayne Shedd with a date of "6/27/02" stating
Deputy Attorney General Tim McNeese had instructed him to intercept
documents meant for Charboneau if they related to Larry Gold or Tira Arbaugh
(R., vol. 1, p. 146 (later introduced as Exhibit 4)); and two purported print-outs of
e-mail exchanges between Shedd and prison guard William Unger detailing the
"Charboneau mission" of intercepting documents related to Tira Arbaugh or Larry
Gold (R., vol. 1, pp. 143-44 (later introduced as Exhibits 7C and 7D)).
The state filed an answer (R., vol. 1, pp. 520-22) and a motion for
summary dismissal (R., vol. 1, pp. 721-22). The bases for the motion were that
the claim was time-barred and successive, being basically a reiteration of the
same claims found untimely in Charboneau's previous post-conviction action;
that Charboneau failed to present a viable Brady10 claim of suppression of
evidence at the trial; and that the letters on which the claims were based are
hearsay.

(R., vol. 1, pp. 727-43; 5/24/13 Tr., p. 31, L. 2-p. 35, L. 9.)

The

district court denied the motion. (R., vol. 2, pp. 755-56, 797-800; 5/24/13 Tr., p.
46, L. 24 - p. 61, L. 13.)
Prior to the evidentiary hearing, the state conceded that the handwriting
on the copy of the letter and envelope alleged to have been written by Tira was
hers (on the basis of handwriting analysis). (R., vol. 2, p. 957; see also Evid. Tr.,
p. 66, Ls. 3-13.) The state limited its concession to the handwriting being Tira's:
it specifically did not concede that the letter or envelope was "genuine or

10

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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authentic," that the "letter [was] what it purports to be," or that its contents were
(R., vol. 2, p. 971; Evid. Tr., p. 66, Ls. 3-13.)

The case proceeded to an evidentiary hearing on the limited issue of
"whether the State or State's agents played a role in concealment of the Tira
Arbaugh letter or whether it has, in fact, been concealed or withheld." (Evid. Tr.,
p. 1, Ls. 12-18; see also R., vol. I, p. 688 (bifurcating the evidentiary hearing and
limiting the scope of the initial hearing to whether "state agents played a role in
. . . concealment").)

Because of this limited scope, no evidence of what

Charboneau or others close to him knew in relation to his claims and when they
knew it was admitted at the hearing. (Evid. Tr., p. 159, L. 6 - p. 160, L. 17; p.
263, Ls. 9-22.) The hearing ultimately included, in part, the following evidence:
On March 18, 2011, Corporal Hiskett, a guard at the Idaho Correctional
Institution-Orofino (hereinafter ICIO) was cleaning a guard room when he
encountered a large envelope with Charboneau's name on it. (Evid. Tr., p. 487,
L. 3 - p. 488, L. 6; p. 497, L. 15 - p. 498, L. 2; see also p. 21, Ls. 12-19.) The
envelope was in the incoming and outgoing tier mail. (Evid. Tr., p. 488, Ls. 7-8.)
Tier mail is an internal system for delivering papers to different parts of the
prison, including "Inmate Concern Forms" or "kites," which are written exchanges
between correction staff and offenders. (Evid. Tr., p. 528, L. 7 - p. 530, L. 2.)
When he did his rounds checking on the cells Corporal Hiskett informed
Charboneau that he had mail at the guard room. (Evid. Tr., p. 487, Ls. 16-20; p.
488, Ls. 15-19.) When Charboneau came to the guard room, Corporal Hiskett
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delivered the envelope to Charboneau and had him open the envelope to make
sure it contained no contraband. (Evid.

, p. 492, L. 4 - p. 495, L. 18.)

Charboneau presented 20 exhibits associated with this envelope.

He

claimed two of the exhibits were exculpatory evidence. (Exhibits 8 (document
allegedly signed by former Jerome County Sheriff Larry Gold), 14 (copy of a
document allegedly written by Tira Arbaugh); see also Exhibits 5A (allegedly a
copy of an envelope to Judge Becker from Tira Arbaugh), 7E (letter allegedly
signed by Larry Gold, used as one of the bases for Charboneau's third postconviction petition).)

Charboneau initially claimed four exhibits were evidence

that State agents had withheld the documents he alleged were exculpatory.
(Exhibits 4 (document allegedly written by prison paralegal DeWayne Shedd), 5
(document allegedly written by former sheriff's deputy Orville Balzer), 7C (printout of alleged email exchange between Shedd and Correction Lieutenant Unger),
70 (an alleged email exchange between Shedd and Correction Lieutenant
Unger).)

Three are envelopes.

(Exhibits 1, 6, 13.)

The remaining nine

documents relate to Charboneau's efforts to bring the post-conviction claims
raised in his third and fifth post-conviction petitions. (Exhibits 2, 3, 7A, 7B, 7F, 9,
10,11,12.)
During the hearing Marc Haws, the prosecutor at Charboneau's criminal
trial, denied ever hiding or instructing others to hide evidence regarding the trial
and testified he had no knowledge of any letter allegedly written by Tira and had
no contact with anyone in the Idaho Department of Correction since leaving the
attorney general's office in 1986. (Evid. Tr., p. 430, L. 21 - p. 433, L. 14.)
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After the evidentiary hearing and submission of evidence, the district court
entered factual findings and legal conclusions.

(R., vol. 3, pp. 109-43.) The

court conciuded that three of the four documents purportedly showing a
conspiracy to intercept documents intended for Charboneau, Exhibits 5, 7C and
7D, were forgeries.

(R., vol. 3, pp. 126, 138-40; vol. 4, p. 527 n.4.)

Nevertheless, the district court "conclud[ed] the Tira Arbaugh letter was
suppressed or withheld by the State, either willfully or inadvertently, from at least
2003 on." (R., vol. 3, p. 142.)
Charboneau moved for summary judgment on the remaining question of
whether he was entitled to relief.

(R., vol. 3, pp. 219-20.)

In support of that

motion he submitted the record of the underlying criminal and initial postconviction actions (R., vol. 3, pp. 207-09 11 ) and affidavits (R., vol. 3, pp. 210-18,
252-505; vol. 4, pp. 1-2). After a hearing on the motion (see generally 9/19/14
Tr.), the court entered an order setting forth preliminary rulings and requesting
additional briefing and input (R., vol. 4, pp. 60-67).

In response, the state

presented several affidavits and deposition transcripts (R., vol. 4, pp. 83-418), as
did Charboneau (R., vol. 4, pp. 439-46).

The district court ultimately granted

summary judgment in favor of Charboneau and ordered a new trial. (R., vol. 4,
pp.

523-94.)

In so doing, the district court held that Exhibit 14, the

multigenerational copy of a document with Tira Arbaugh's handwriting, was

Because this submission was on a disc that was merely photocopied into the
record (R., vol. 3, p. 209), the state requested the Court to take judicial notice of
its records in dockets 16339 (the first appeal in the criminal case), 16741 (the
appeal of the first two post-conviction actions, addressed in the same appeal as
the criminal case pursuant to unitary review), and 19635 (the second appeal in
the criminal case).
11

23

admissible hearsay (R., vol. 4, pp. 531-47); that Exhibit 8, the document allegedly
signed by Larry Gold detailing a conversation with Mito Alonzo (which Alonzo
claimed did not happen), was admissible for the non-hearsay purpose of showing
Mito Alonzo had "very detailed knowledge of the contents" of Exhibit 14, from
which it was possible to draw the inference that Marc Haws also knew about
Exhibit 14 (R., vol. 4, pp. 547-52); and that withholding Exhibit 14 constituted a
Brady violation (R., vol. 4, pp. 554-81).

The state filed a timely appeal from the judgment. (R., vol. 4, pp. 659-61,
663-66.)
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ISSUES

1.

Did the district court err by concluding that Charboneau's claims were not
barred by the applicable statute of limitation?

2.

Did the district court err when it concluded that three documents, one
purportedly written by Tira Arbaugh and one purportedly written by Larry
Gold, both of whom died years prior to the filing of this case, and one
document purportedly signed by DeWayne Shedd, were admissible
hearsay?

3.

Did the district court err when it found a Brady violation?

4.

Did the district court err by considering, ex parte, evidence it had
specifically ruled inadmissible at the evidentiary hearing?

5.

Did the district court err by admitting evidence of prior bad acts and then
considering that evidence to show actions in conformity with character?

6.

If this Court reverses the district court's judgment granting post-conviction
relief, should it vacate the district court's order granting release on bond
and order that Charboneau be immediately taken into custody so as to
prevent flight during the 21-day or more interval between the issuance of
its written opinion and that opinion becoming final?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred By Concluding That Charboneau's Claims Were Not
Barred By The Applicable Statute Of Limitation
A.

Introduction
District Judge Butler dismissed Charboneau·s· third petition for post-

conviction relief as untimely.

(R., vol. 2, pp. 362-83.)

That petition included

claims that "Tira Arbaugh during the trial and sentencing told petitioner's mother
that she and her sister Tiffinie [sic) had been instructed by the prosecutor to
withhold certain evidence and testimony relative to the killing of Marilyn Arbaugh"
and that "Tira Arbaugh made statements to the brother of the petitioner which
incriminated Tiffinie [sic) Arbaugh in the killing of her mother, Marilyn Arbaugh."
(R., vol. 2, p. 368.) He also supported his petition with "a letter from Larry Gold"
he received on June 5, 2001, that stated Gold's belief that the facts of
Charboneau's case had been manipulated.

(R., vol. 2, pp. 367, 371.)

Judge

Butler dismissed the petition as time-barred and unsupported by relevant or
admissible evidence. (R., vol. 2, pp. 364-71.) This Court affirmed the dismissal.
Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 904-06, 174 P. 3d 870, 874-76 (2007).
The state moved for summary dismissal of the current petition on the
basis that it was time-barred, and that the holding in the third post-conviction
case conclusively established that Charboneau did not bring the current claim
within a reasonable time after having notice of it. (R., vol. 1, pp. 721, 731-33; vol.
2, pp. 445-47.) The district court denied the motion. (R., vol. 2, pp. 755-56.)
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The district court, expressing the opinion that is it "unfair ... to make a rule
which bars meritorious claims on timeliness grounds," concluded that the prior
post-conviction had raised and ruled upon only a "particular narrow issue" of
"awareness of a second gun" while the present petition "raises a number of
questions across several fronts that are new." (5/24/13 Tr., p. 47, L. 14 - p. 49,
L. 13.) The district court stated that the reason the claims are new is because

Charboneau "no longer allege[s) that Tira told someone else some different
version of what happened at trial" but the "claim now is that Tira herself
purportedly made statements supporting Charboneau's current petition in a letter
to the previously presiding trial judge." (R., vol. 2, p. 798.) The district court also
stated: "Although these might be the same category of some claims made
before, the current claims allege different facts." (R., vol. 2, p. 798.) The district
court also stated it "continues to adhere to its previous ruling that this is not
necessarily a new claim but new evidence supporting an old claim." (R., vol. 2,
p. 799.) Finally, the district court said it "would be a paradox of the first order to
rule that evidence allegedly suppressed for over 20 years could be deemed
untimely, after it has finally been uncovered, because Petitioner knew about it or
could have, (or actually did), make a similar claim earlier that he was unable to
back up with sufficient or admissible evidence." (R., vol. 2, p. 799.)
The court erred for the following reasons: (1) The merits of the claim are
irrelevant to its timeliness; (2) the current petition raised the same claims as the
prior petition, and even if somehow different in details, the prior petition shows
notice; (3) supporting an untimely claim with different evidence does not render it

27

timely; and (4) it is not a "paradox" to run the limitation period on a claim from the
time it was known.

B.

Standard Of Review
"The Court exercises free review over questions of law and matters of

statutory interpretation. In particular, the determination of the applicable statute
of limitation is a question of law over which this Court has free review." Guzman
v. Oiercy, 155 Idaho 928, 934, 318 P3d 918, 924 (2014) (internal quotes,
citations and brackets omitted).

C.

Charboneau Did Not Bring The Current Action Within A Reasonable Time
Of Acquiring Notice Of His Claim That Tira Arbaugh Stated She Had
Provided False Testimony At Trial
A petition for post-conviction relief must be filed "within one (1) year from

the expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or
from the determination of a proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later."
I.C. § 19-4902. "[S)tate misconduct implicates core due process considerations
that may trigger equitable tolling." Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 251, 220
P.3d 1066, 1070 (2009). In the case of a Brady violation "there may be tolling of
the one year statute of limitations until discovery of the Brady violation."
Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 904, 174 P. 3d 870, 874 (2007).
Timeliness is then measured "from the date of notice, not from the date a
petitioner assembles a complete cache of evidence."

Jsi. at 905,

220 P.3d at 875.

The party asserting an otherwise untimely Brady claim must "establish that he
has done so within a reasonable time."

Jsi. at 905,
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174 P.3d at 875.

In this case there is no dispute that Charboneau did not bring the current
petition within one year of the determination of his criminal appeal.

Thus, the

only question is whether he established that he brought his petition within a
reasonable time after having notice of his claim. That issue is resolved by the
fact that he made the same claim in 2002, and it was time-barred then because it
was not brought within a reasonable time of having notice of the claim.
Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 904, 174 P. 3d at 87 4.
The district court concluded that notice should be measured from the
March 18, 2011 delivery of the "packet" of documents on two bases. First, the
district court held that differences between the prior and current claims showed
Charboneau lacked notice of the current claim. (5/24/13 Tr., p. 47, L. 14 - p. 48,
L. 7; R., vol. 2, p. 798.) Second, although the current claim "is not necessarily a

new claim" the statute of limitations should be tolled because the state
suppressed evidence to support the claim. (5/24/13 Tr., p. 48, L. 7 - p. 49, L. 13;
R., vol. 2, p. 799.) Neither determination withstands analysis.
The district court's ruling that Charboneau lacked notice of his claim is
incompatible with the record. In his third petition, according to the district judge
presiding in that case, Charboneau "claim[ed) there to be newly discovered
evidence as follows: ... That Tira Arbaugh during the trial and sentencing told
petitioner's mother that she and her sister Tiffinie [sic] had been instructed by the
prosecutor to withhold certain evidence and testimony relative to the killing of
Marilyn Arbaugh." (R., vol. 2, p. 368.)

Charboneau also claimed that "at the trial

and sentencing" Tira told Charboneau's mother that the prosecutors had
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"suborned perjury" from her. (R., vol. 2, pp. 366-67.) He "attempt[ed] to offer as
admissible evidence statements attributed to Tira Arbaugh" that she was
"instructed by the prosecutors as to what to say and to not disclose evidence that
may be favorable to the defense." (R., vol. 2, p. 370.) This is the same claim
Charboneau made in the current petition. (R., vol. 1, pp. 135, 138, 140.) The
district court's conclusion that Charboneau lacked notice of his claim that Tira
had made statements challenging the accuracy of her testimony until he received
the packet of documents does not withstand comparison to the record.
The district court's alternative holding, based on Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho
641, 8 P.3d 636 (2000), lacks legal merit.

In that case an inmate named

Leytham testified at Sivak's trial and in cross-examination stated he had not been
given any deal or consideration in exchange for his testimony.
at 639.

at 644, 8 P.3d

Sivak claimed in his first post-conviction case "that the prosecution failed

to reveal the substance of agreements with Leytham."
639-40.

~

~

at 644-45, 8 P.3d at

The district court concluded Sivak failed to prove that claim, and the

Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. ~ at 645, 8 P.3d at 640. Four letters regarding
prosecutorial or police actions favoring Leytham, which had not previously been
provided to Sivak,
proceedings.

~

came to light in subsequent federal habeas corpus

at 643, 8 P.3d at 638.

Sivak brought a successive petition

based on these letters, again asserting that the state failed to reveal an
agreement with Leytham.

~

at 644, 8 P.3d at 639.

On appeal from the summary dismissal of the successive petition, the
state argued that Sivak "waived this claim for relief under I.C. 19-2719(5)
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because the claim was advanced in a previous post-conviction proceeding." Id.
at 646, 8 P .3d at 641. In rejecting this argument the Court stated:
We reject the State's theory that Sivak has waived this claim for
relief merely because he raised the issue in his first post-conviction
petition. As Sivak concedes, this petition presents not a new claim
but new evidence supporting an old claim. Applying this rule as the
State requests would result in Idaho courts being unable to
entertain evidence of actual innocence in successive postconviction petitions, even where the evidence was clearly material
or had been suppressed by prosecutorial misconduct. We must be
vigilant against imposing a rule of law that will work injustice in the
name of judicial efficiency.

JiL at 647,

8 P.3d at 642. This analysis does not apply in this case.

First, the Sivak holding was an interpretation of I.C. § 19-2719, which
applies in capital cases and does not apply to I.C. § 19-4902, the statute
applicable in this case. See Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 252-53, 220 P.3d
1066, 1071-72 (2009) (distinguishing Sivak on the basis that the court has never
applied its rationale to I.C. § 19-4902).
Second, and more importantly, Sivak does not stand for the proposition
that timeliness should be measured from the discovery of new evidence as
opposed to notice of the claim. Sivak timely brought his claim and it was litigated
on the merits; the only question was whether he could bring a successive petition
asserting the same claim because of new evidence. Sivak's holding that state
suppression of evidence prevents application of a successive petition bar is
irrelevant to application of the statute of limitation.

The relevant inquiry for

purposes of the statute of limitation was when Charboneau had notice of his
claim. Simply put, Charboneau cannot claim that state suppression of Exhibit 14
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in 2003 (even if true) is what rendered his 2002 petition untimely, thus allowing
him to resurrect the claim in that petition.
Finally, application of the rule that timeliness is measured from notice
rather than acquisition of evidence does not work any injustice in this case. The
record in this case establishes Charboneau had notice of his claim that Tira
made statements asserting that she had given false testimony at the behest of
the prosecution while she was alive, in fact as early as the criminal trial in 1985
and sentencing in 1986. Had he brought his claims timely then, Charboneau (or
the state) could have called Tira Arbaugh as a witness. Instead, for reasons he
has never presented to any court, Charboneau waited until after Tira's death to
assert this claim. Although state action that deprives a petitioner of notice tolls
the statute of limitation, Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 251, 220 P.3d 1066,
1070 (2009) ("state misconduct implicates core due process considerations that
may trigger equitable tolling"), the Sivak case does not support the proposition
that a petitioner with notice despite state suppression of evidence is excused
from making a timely post-conviction claim.
The record establishes that Charboneau did not bring his claim within a
reasonable time after he had notice of it. To the contrary, the claim was untimely
as of 2002 (when he filed this third petition), and more so in 2011 (when he filed
the current petition).

Because timeliness is measured from notice and not the

acquisition of evidence, the district court erred by not dismissing this untimely
petition.
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11.
The District Court Erred When It Concluded That Three Documents-Two
Letters Purportedly Written By Persons Who Are Deceased And One Document
Purportedly Written Or Signed By Shedd-Were Admissible Hearsay
A.

Introduction
The state moved for summary dismissal on the theory that the document

ultimately introduced into evidence as Exhibit 14 could not support a claim in
post-conviction because it was inadmissible hearsay. (R., vol. 1, p. 721, 742; vol.
2, pp. 454-60.) The district court denied the motion, concluding Exhibit 14 was
admissible as a statement against penal interest. (Tr., p. 52, L. 3 - p. 60, L. 19.)
During the evidentiary hearing Charboneau offered Exhibit 4, a document
allegedly handwritten by prison paralegal DeWayne Shedd; Exhibit 8, a
document allegedly signed by former sheriff Larry Gold; and Exhibit 14, a
document allegedly written by Tira Arbaugh. (Evid. Tr., p. 31, Ls. 7-8 (Exhibit 4);
p. 384, Ls. 1-8 (requesting admission of Exhibit 4 for "substantive value"); p. 60,
Ls. 6-7 (offering Exhibit 8); p. 65, Ls. 12-17 (Exhibit 14).) The state objected to
consideration of the contents of each of these exhibits as hearsay. (Evid. Tr., p.
31, Ls. 9-22; p. 60, Ls. 8-9; p. 65, L. 18 - p. 66, L. 21; p. 384, L. 24 - p. 385, L.
3.) The district court overruled these objections and admitted Exhibits 4 and 14
without limitation. (Evid. Tr., p. 390, Ls. 2-22.)
The court reiterated its ruling of admissibility of Exhibit 14, and also
concluded Exhibit 8, a document purportedly signed by Gold, was admissible for
the non-hearsay purpose of showing the knowledge of third persons. (R., vol. 4,
pp. 531-49.)

It considered both exhibits in granting summary judgment to

Charboneau. (R., vol. 4, pp. 550-52, 573-81.)
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These decisions were erroneous because the exhibits are inadmissible
hearsay.

B.

Standard Of Review
Review of a trial court's hearsay rulings "is limited to determining whether"

the district court's decision was "within the outer boundaries of its discretion,"
"consistent with" applicable legal standards, and "reached through an exercise of
reason." In re Estate of Conway, 152 Idaho 933, 941, 277 P.3d 380, 388 (2012).

C.

The District Court Erred By Admitting Exhibit 4 For The Truth Of The
Matters Asserted Therein
Exhibit 4 is a document purportedly handwritten and signed by prison

paralegal DeWayne Shedd. (R., vol. 3, pp. 119-21.) The district court deemed it
of "extraordinary significance." (R., vol. 3, p. 121 (emphasis original).) Indeed,
the district court based its findings that Shedd intercepted Charboneau's mail,
and did so at the behest of others, almost exclusively upon this exhibit. (R., vol.
3, pp. 134-35.) The district court erred by admitting the exhibit at the evidentiary
hearing over the state's hearsay objection.
'"Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted."

I.R.E. 801(c).

There is no doubt that the document is a

"statement," because it is a "written assertion." I.R.E. 801 (a). There is likewise
no doubt that the document's author (whether that be Shedd as found by the
district court or the forger of other documents in this case as asserted by the
state) is a "declarant." l.R.E. 801(b).

Finally, the record shows the document
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was both offered and received for the "truth of the matter[s] asserted." (R., vol. 3,
p. 121.) The document is thus hearsay.
"Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by" the Idaho Rules of
Evidence.

I.R.E. 802.

No hearsay exception applicable to Exhibit 4 has ever

been offered by Charboneau nor found by the district court. (Evid. Tr., p. 384, L.
1 - p. 391, L. 8.) Because Exhibit 4 is hearsay and not subject to any exception,
the district court abused its discretion in admitting it and then considering it for
the truth of the matters asserted.

D.

The District Court Erred By Admitting Exhibit 14 For The Truth Of The
Matters Asserted Therein
The district court concluded that Exhibit 14 was admissible evidence when

denying the state's motion for summary dismissal, at the evidentiary hearing, and
in granting Charboneau summary judgment.

Review shows the document is

inadmissible hearsay, so the district court erred at all three stages.
The district court ultimately concluded that the exhibit fell within two
hearsay exceptions: (1) as a statement against penal interest because it would
have subjected Tira to perjury charges, and (2) under the general "catchall"
provision.

(R., vol. 4, pp. 532-47. 12 ) The district court applied incorrect legal

standards. Application of correct legal standards shows that neither exception
applies.

The state also submits the district court erred by overruling the state's hearsay
objection and considering the date written in the document as evidence of when
the document was written and the salutation to Judge Becker as evidence the
declarant intended the letter to be read by Judge Becker under the "things that
you write on a letter" hearsay exception (Evid. Tr., p. 418, L. 25 - p. 421, L. 10),
because no such exception exists. See I.R.E. 801-804.
12
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1.

The Exhibit Is Not Admissible As A Statement Against Penal
Interest

To be admissible as a statement against penal interest, the statement must
have "at the time of its making ... so far tended to subject declarant to ... criminal
liability ... that a reasonable man in declarant's position would not have made the
statement unless declarant believed it to be true." I.RE. 804(b)(3). Furthermore, a
"statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered

to

exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly
indicate the trustworthiness of the statement."

I.RE. 804(b)(3). Analysis shows

that Exhibit 14 meets none of these requirements for admissibility.
(a)

The District Court Erred By Admitting Exhibit 14 As A Whole
Rather Than Determining The Admissibility Of Individual
Declarations Within The Exhibit

'"Rule 804(b)(3)

. . . does not allow admission of non-self-inculpatory

statements, even if they are made within a broader narrative that is generally selfinculpatory. "' State v. Averett, 142 Idaho 879, 890, 136 P.3d 350, 361 (Ct. App.
2006) (quoting Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 600-01

(1994)

(interpreting nearly identical federal rule)). The reason for this rule is that "within a
given declaration, there may be many statements both self-inculpatory and
implicating another person," and therefore "each statement must be determined to
be sufficiently reliable even if it is made as part of a narrative."

kt

"Accordingly,

each admitted statement or part thereof must be found to be truly against the penal
interest of the declarant." Id.

36

The district court did not apply these standards.

It identified only two

discrete parts of the letter that could have subjected Tira to a perjury charge
because they were contrary to her trial testimony: specifically, the statement that
she did not hear a second episode of shots fired and the statement she had a pistol
and Tiffnie had a rifle when they first left the house. (R., vol. 4, pp. 532-33.) Under
the district court's own reasoning, therefore, only these two declarations could fall
within the ambit of the statement against penal interest exception-the rest of
Exhibit 14 would not.

Averett, 142 Idaho at 890, 136 P.3d at 361 (non-self-

inculpatory statements in a broader self-inculpatory narrative not admissible).
Statements in Exhibit 14 about what prosecutors, police officers, and family
members did simply would not have subjected Tira to any risk of prosecution for
perjury. See Williamson, 512 U.S. at 601 ("The district court may not assume for
purposes of Rule 804(b )(3) that a statement is self-inculpatory because it is part of
a fuller confession, and this is especially true when the statement implicates
someone else."). The district court erred by finding the entire document admissible
when it identified only two discrete statements that tended to subject the asserted
declarant to criminal liability.
(b)

The Declarations Identified By The District Court Had No
Tendency To Subject The Declarant To Criminal Liability

The two statements identified by the district court as creating a risk of perjury
would not have "tended to subject" Tira to "criminal liability" for two reasons. First,
any perjury charge would have been barred by the applicable statute of limitation.
Tira testified at trial on April 29, 1985. (Trial Tr., vol. 5, p. 1196, L. 1; p. 1233, Ls.
1-3.)

At that time the limitation period for prosecution of felonies other than
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murder was three years.

I.C. § 19-402 (1972).

There is no evidence in the

record the letter was written before the statute of limitations would have run on
April 29, 1988.

Because the statute of limitation for perjury had run, the

statements the district court found contrary to trial testimony had no tendency to
"subject" Tira Griggs to "criminal liability" for perjury "at the time of [their] making."
I.R.E. 804(b)(3).
Second, Tira was 14 years old when she testified.

(Trial Tr., vol. 5, p.

1234, Ls. 5-6.) At that time, acts that would have been crimes if committed by
adults were subject to the Youth Rehabilitation Act and not criminal proceedings.
I.C. § 16-1803 (1982). As such, no "criminal liability" for perjury could have been
pursued by the state, only juvenile adjudication.
The district court articulated no theory by which the statute of limitation
and juvenile jurisdiction would not have absolutely prevented Tira from being
criminally liable for perjury. (R., vol. 4, p. 534.) The district court instead stated
that Tira "was only 19 when she wrote the letter" and "was not a sophisticated
criminal or one schooled in the law." (Id.) The district court did not say what
these characteristics have to do with admissibility, however. 13 Because there is

The district court's opinion could be read as concluding that Tira was aware of
what would constitute perjury but ignorant of the statute of limitations and that
she would be subject to only juvenile jurisdiction. Such a conclusion would be
based entirely upon speculation about the general knowledge of 19-year-olds
and an assumption that Tira was neither a "sophisticated criminal" nor "schooled
in law." Charboneau presented no evidence of what Tira did or did not know
about these matters. More importantly, however, the district court did not explain
how a statement that as a matter of law created no risk of prosecution could be
deemed to have a tendency to subject the declarant to criminal liability.
13
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no legal theory by which Exhibit 14 could have subjected Tira to criminal liability,
it was not a statement against her penal interest.

(c)

The Record Does Not Support Any Conclusion That A
Reasonable Man In The Declarant's Position Would Not
Have Made The Two Identified Declarations

Even if there had been some risk of criminal liability, that risk was not
enough to show that a "reasonable man in declarant's position would not have
made the statement unless declarant believed it to be true." I.R.E. 804(b)(3). To
subject Tira to criminal liability the state would have had to prove that she willfully
provided false testimony. I.C. § 18-5401. She was at risk of prosecution, then,
only if the state concluded that the statements in the document were in fact true
and her testimony at trial was in fact false, and could prove it.

A perjury

prosecution would result only if the state abandoned its theory of Charboneau's
guilt (and ignored most of the evidence presented at trial) and took a completely
contrary position. The risk of the state doing so was so minimal it did nothing to
guarantee truthfulness.
The district court concluded that it did not have to "make a determination
whether the statements in the letter are actually true, or whether there was any
substantial likelihood of a criminal prosecution" because it was sufficient to
conclude "she was calling into question her own statements under oath." (R.,
vol. 4, p. 533.) The district court's determination that any statement recanting
prior testimony is sufficient to meet this reasonable man standard is contrary to
the analysis of every court that has reviewed the reliability of such statements.
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"It is axiomatic that witness recantations must be looked upon with the
utmost suspicion." Haouari v. United States, 510 F.3d 350, 353 (2d Cir. 2007).
"Courts properly view recanting affidavits and testimony with great suspicion" and
"unsworn recantations deserve increased suspicion." Ferrell v. Wall, 889 A.2d 177,
184 (R.I. 2005). The Arizona Supreme Court has declared that "there is no form of
proof so unreliable as recanting testimony." State v. Sims, 409 P.2d 17, 22 (Ariz.
1965) (internal quotation omitted). "[R]ecantation evidence is highly suspect, even
when it involves an admission of perjury." Commonwealth v. Woods, 575 A.2d
601, 603 (Pa.Super 1990).· See also State v. Ruffin, 475 So.2d 1375, 1382 (La.
App., 5th Cir., 1985) ("recantations are highly suspicious"); Case v. Hatch, 731 F.3d
1015, 1044 (10th Cir. 2013) ("recanted testimony is notoriously unreliable").
Inconsistency between statements and testimony given under oath demonstrates a
lack of trustworthiness. United States v. Berry, 496 Fed.Appx. 938, 942 (11th Cir.
2012) (statement against penal interest not trustworthy where recanted and
inconsistent statement made under oath).

In United States v. Mackin, 561 F.2d

958, 961-62 (D.C. Cir. 1977), the court applied the same trustworthiness standard
as articulated in I.R.E. 804(b)(3) and stated that the analysis starts from the
"premise that recantations by witnesses for the prosecution are viewed with
suspicion." Even an express claim of a high motive for providing the recantation (to
"get right with God") and acknowledgement that the trial testimony was perjurious
was insufficient to vest the hearsay statement recanting sworn testimony with
reliability.

kt

at 962-63.

The district court's reasoning that the declaration is
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trustworthy because it is inconsistent with prior sworn testimony is illogical and
contrary to applicable legal standards.
A "reasonable man in declarant's position" would have known that the risk of
prosecution (much less conviction) for perjury was directly proportional to the risk
that the state would conclude that the new statement was truth and the evidence it
presented at trial was false, and thus abandon its theory of the criminal case. The
odds that the state would conclude in the underlying criminal case that the evidence
showing two rounds of shots and one rifle was wrong and that the new statements
that there was only one round of shots by Charboneau and a second round of shots
by Tiffnie carrying a second rifle are nil. Therefore the risk of criminal liability arising
from the new statements was nil. Fear of criminal liability would not have been a
significant motivation to a reasonable man in Tira's position.
(d)

There Are No Corroborating Circumstances Clearly Indicating
The Trustworthiness Of The Statements

A statement against penal interest "offered to exculpate the accused" is not
admissible unless "corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness
of the statement." I.RE. 804(b)(3). In State v. Meister, 148 Idaho 236, 242, 220
P.3d 1055, 1061 (2009), the Idaho Supreme Court adopted "Arizona's standard
and seven factor test for the corroboration requirement pursuant to I.RE.
804(b)(3)." Under that standard the corroboration requirement is '"limited to asking

whether evidence in the record corroborating and contradicting the declarant's
statement would permit a reasonable person to believe that the statement could be
true."' Meister, 148 Idaho at 242, 220 P.3d at 1061 (brackets omitted, emphasis
original) (quoting State v. LeGrand, 734 P.2d 563, 570 (1987)). "This will protect
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the province of the jury as the fact-finder and prevent the judge from 'being able to
bootstrap himself or herself into the jury box via the evidentiary rules."'

&

(brackets

omitted) (quoting LeGrand, 734 P.2d at 570). Application of this test shows that the
corroboration requirement is not met.
First, contradictory evidence is legion. Claims in Exhibit 14 that Tiffnie had
a second rifle and that there was not a second round of shots are directly contrary
to Tira's preliminary hearing testimony, Tira's trial testimony, Tiffnie's preliminary
hearing testimony, Tiffnie's trial testimony, the physical evidence of a single gun as
the murder weapon, and even Charboneau's testimony (all as set forth above). No
reasonable person could believe the recitation of events in Exhibit 14 is true in the
face of nearly universal and overwhelming contrary evidence. 14
In making its ruling the district court cited: (1) the declarant's mental state
as set forth in the exhibit; (2) Tira, the purported declarant, was 19 and
Charboneau killed her mother; (3) the declarant's stated motives in writing Exhibit
14; (4) "no evidence of 'tailoring"' Exhibit 14 to fit the evidence, so where it is
contrary to other evidence it is without "contrivance"; (5) "some of her assertions
... might conveniently fit the truth"; (6) Exhibit 14 is "the product of a rational

In addition, there is overwhelming evidence that Exhibit 14 was not created
under the circumstances set forth within it. Tira was living in Nevada with her
new husband and did not have transportation to travel to Bruneau. (Evid. Tr., p.
453, L. 7 - p. 455, L. 3; p. 467, Ls. 11-14.) In addition there was no street dance
in Bruneau on the date on the document (September 6, 1984). (R., vol. 4, pp.
69-92.) The District court concluded that there was probably a perfectly good
(but unknowable) reason for the inconsistency and, anyway, the truth or falsity of
the explanation in Exhibit 14 for how it came into being is not really relevant to
the reliability of Exhibit 14. (R., vol. 4, pp. 544-45.) The state submits this is
substantial evidence of fabrication that should not have been ignored by the
district court.
14
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mind"; (7) Exhibit 14 "invites inquiry"; (8) Exhibit 14 "names people"; (9) the
accusations of a Brady violation by Haws were corroborated (by inadmissible and
unadmitted evidence regarding the Paradis case, see Argument IV, infra); and
(10) the "value accorded" Exhibit 14 "by those who intentionally concealed it."
(R., vol. 4, pp. 535-43 (emphasis original).) The factors found by the district court

are irrelevant to the applicable test of "whether evidence in the record

corroborating and contradicting the declarant's statement would permit a
reasonable person to believe that the statement could be true." Meister, 148 Idaho
at 242, 220 P.3d at 1061 (emphasis original, brackets and internal quotes omitted).
Rather than applying the correct standard, which measures trustworthiness of the
statement against corroborating evidence, the factors cited by the district court
address the declarant's credibility, a matter "within the province of the jury rather
than the judge."

LeGrand, 734 P.2d at 570.

The district court applied a legal

standard that allowed it to erroneously bootstrap a determination of admissibility
from its own credibility determination.
Exhibit 14 is hearsay. It is not a document shown to have any tendency at
all to expose the declarant to criminal liability, much less to a degree a
reasonable person would feel the need to be truthful out of fear of criminal
liability.

In addition, the statements in Exhibit 14 are not corroborated in any

meaningful way by evidence in the record.

2.

Exhibit 14 Is Not Admissible Under The Catchall Exception

To be admissible under a "catchall" hearsay exception the proffered
statement must have "equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" as
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the other hearsay exceptions. I.R.E. 804(b)(6). The analysis "contemplates that
the trial court will look at all the other evidence to determine whether it tends to
corroborate the hearsay statement." State v. Giles, 115 Idaho 984, 987, 772
P.2d 191, 194 (1989).

In addition, the proffered hearsay must be "offered as

evidence of a material fact," be "more probative on the point for which it is offered
than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable
efforts," and "the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will
best be served by admission of the statement."

I.R.E. 804(b)(6).

Exhibit 14

meets none of these criteria.
First, Exhibit 14 does not have equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness.

As set forth above, recantations of trial testimony are

notoriously unreliable. One of the exceptions against which the trustworthiness
of Exhibit 14 should be measured is previously presented sworn testimony
subjected to cross-examination. 1.R.E. 804(b)(1 ). It strains credulity to conclude
that an unsworn, uncross-examined written statement recanting sworn testimony
has equivalent guarantees of trustworthiness.
Second, Exhibit 14 is not offered as evidence of a material fact. To the
contrary, the Exhibit's primary (if not exclusive) purpose would be to contradict
Tira's sworn trial testimony, an impeachment purpose.
Third, Exhibit 14 is not more probative than other evidence. Generally, a
witness's hearsay statement is not more probative than the same witness's
sworn testimony on the same subject. State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 404,
958 P.2d 22, 30 (Ct. App. 1998) (citing fact declarant had given testimony on
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subject as ground for concluding his hearsay statement was not more probative).
Exhibit 14 is not more probative than Tira's sworn testimony provided at the
preliminary hearing and then the trial.
Finally, the purposes of the hearsay rules and interests of justice are not
served by admission of Exhibit 14.
The district court concluded that "the primary difference" between the
catchall exception and the statement against penal interest exception is that the
former required "no showing that the statement subjects the declarant to civil or
criminal liability." (R., vol. 4, p. 546.) The state submits that by applying half of
the criteria for admissibility as a statement against penal interest the district court
was not applying a test requiring equivalent guarantees of trustworthiness.
Moreover, the district court relied primarily upon evidence within Exhibit 14 to
bootstrap a finding of trustworthiness. The judge found statements within Exhibit
14-such as the declarant's statement of motive for writing the document, the
description of the circumstances of writing the document, and the date and
statement the document was intended to go to Judge Becker-to be credible in
order to find the Exhibit credible. Finally, as set forth above in more detail, the
district court did not make a finding of trustworlhiness based on comparison of
the Exhibit to other evidence of the same events, but rather made a credibility
determination that was within the province of a jury.

The question before the

court was not the credibility of the declarant, but whether the statement was
sufficiently trustworthy that it could be considered by a jury without the benefit of
cross-examination.
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As to the three other elements, the district court did not articulate how
Exhibit 14 went to a material fact as opposed to mere impeachment, how Exhibit
14 was more probative than other evidence, especially sworn testimony, or how
its admission would serve the general purposes of the hearsay rules or the
interests of justice. (R., vol. 4, p. 547.) As stated above, none of these elements
is shown by the record. The district court erred by finding Exhibit 14 admissible
under the catch-all exception to the hearsay rule.
Because Exhibit 14 is inadmissible hearsay, the district court erred by not
granting the state's motion for summary dismissal for failure to support the
petition with admissible evidence. It also erred in granting Charboneau summary
judgment.

E.

The District Court Erred By Admitting Exhibit 8 To Demonstrate The
Knowledge Of A Third Person
Exhibit 8 is a document apparently signed by Larry Gold, who died before

this case was brought. It contains the following out-of-court statement:
[l]n the fall of 1989, my chief deputy Mito Alanzo [sic-Alonzo]
confided in me his concern about the fact that the District Court
clerk [sic] Cheryl Watts was in possession of a letter which had
been delivered to the Jerome County Courthouse via The [sic]
United States postal [sic] Service. Chief deputy [sic] Alanzo [sic]
informed me that the letter at issue had been addressed to the
district court Judge [sic] Philip Becker and had been sent by Tira
Arbaugh, the daughter of Marilyn Arbaugh. Chief Deputy Alanzo
[sic] told me that the subject matter of this letter had significant
relevance concerning the Charboneau case. Chief Deputy Alanzo
[sic] stated that his concern was that the District Court Clerk Cheryl
Watts had requested that he help her to destroy the letter.
(Exhibits, part 1, pp. 109-110.)

The district court stated this evidence "was

offered to prove Mita Alonzo had very detailed knowledge of the contents of that
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letter, and when he knew about it" and "may be admitted for this purpose." (R.,
vol. 4, p. 549 (emphasis omitted). 15 )
Evidence of an out-of-court statement is hearsay if "offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted."

I.RE. 801 (c).

Where hearsay is

"included within hearsay" the evidence is admissible where "each part of the
combined statements conforms with an exception to the hearsay rule."

I.R.E.

805.
Exhibit 8 has multiple layers of hearsay.

The first layer is that the

document itself is an out-of-court statement offered for the truth of the matter
asserted. In this layer is the factual assertion that Mita Alonzo made a statement
to the declarant (supposedly Gold) in 1989. The second layer of hearsay is the
contents of that claimed statement by Alonzo: that court clerk Cheryl Watts was
in possession of a letter and solicited Alonzo's help to destroy it. The final layer
(because the source of Alonzo's information is apparently Watts) is that the letter
was from Tira Arbaugh to Judge Becker, was sent by mail, and was related to the
Charboneau case.

Everything in this statement is hearsay because every

The district court determined it could, from the conclusion that Mita Alonzo
(who had no involvement in the Charboneau case) had detailed knowledge of the
letter, draw the inference for purposes of summary judgment that "agents of the
prosecuting attorney," apparently Marc Haws, also knew about the letter because
it was "talk of the building" in 1989. (R., vol. 4, pp. 550-52 (emphasis original).)
The record contains no indication that Marc Haws set foot in the Jerome County
Courthouse after his last appearance in the underlying criminal case in 1986.
(#16741 R., vol. 1, pp. 155-56 (Haws' last appearance); vol. 2, pp. 155-56
(appointment of Peter Erbland as special prosecutor).) Even disregarding the
document's hearsay nature it was not relevant to prove any person's knowledge
other than Alonzo, Gold and Watts. I.R.E. 401.
15
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possible matter it could prove requires reliance on at least one, and generally all
three, layers of hearsay being true.
The district court's conclusion that Exhibit 8 may be admitted for the nonhearsay purpose of showing Alonzo's knowledge of and about a letter regarding
the Charboneau case does not withstand scrutiny. If the declarant (purportedly
Gold) is not telling the truth about having a conversation with Alonzo, or is lying
about the contents of that conversation, the evidence is not relevant to prove
Alonzo's knowledge.

If a person claimed that he had a conversation with

Abraham Lincoln in 2008, in which Lincoln said that General Grant smoked only
Cuban cigars, no sane person would conclude such was evidence of Lincoln's
knowledge of Grant's smoking habits.

Likewise, if the declarant is lying about

having a conversation with Alonzo about a letter, the evidence has no ability to
prove Alonzo's knowledge, much less Haws'. The district court's analysis relies
on the truth of matters asserted in an out-of-court declaration and therefore its
determination that it is not hearsay is error. The district court's grant of summary
judgment, based on the above erroneous hearsay rulings, should be vacated.

111.
The District Court Erred When It Found A Brady Violation

A

Introduction
The district court initially granted Charboneau a new sentencing for what it

concluded was a Brady violation, but after realizing that the law would not allow a
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resentencing to grant its preferred remedy of credit for time served 16 the court
reconsidered and granted Charboneau a new trial. (R., vol. 4, pp. 61-62, 530-31,
554-81.) The district court's ultimate conclusion there was a Brady violation is
erroneous for three reasons.

First, the Brady doctrine is inapplicable to post-

conviction withholding of evidence.

Second, application of the correct legal

standards to the facts found by the district court shows no Brady violation. Third,
the district court's factual findings are clearly erroneous and based upon shifting
the burden of proof to the state.

B.

Standard Of Review
Post-conviction proceedings are civil in nature and therefore
the applicant must prove the allegations by a preponderance of the
evidence. On review, the appellate court will not disturb the lower
court's factual findings unless the factual findings are clearly
erroneous. The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given
to their testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the
evidence are all matters solely within the province of the district
court. When reviewing mixed questions of law and fact, this Court
will defer to the factual findings of the district judge unless those
findings are clearly erroneous. This Court exercises free review of
the district court's application of the relevant law to the facts.

The statute controlling sentencing for first-degree murder in place at the
relevant time required a sentence of life if the death penalty was not imposed, the
district court having discretion only to impose a fixed life or an indeterminate life
sentence. I.C. § 18-4004 (1977); State v. Wilson, 107 Idaho 506, 690 P.2d 1338
(1984). The district court found that leaving Charboneau's release up to the
Commission of Pardons and Parole (presumably by imposing an indeterminate
life sentence), which would then monitor his parole for the rest of Charboneau's
life, was an inadequate remedy because the district court believed the Idaho
Department of Correction was complicit in withholding evidence from
Charboneau. (R., vol. 4, pp. 530-31.) The district court's self-reversal on remedy
is troubling, and is based significantly on a failure to recognize that the
Commission of Pardons and Parole is an independent commission not subject to
the control of the Idaho Department of Correction. I.C. § 20-210.
16
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Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 56, 106 P.3d 376, 382 (2004) (citations omitted).
A factual finding can be clearly erroneous if it is against the "clear weight of the
evidence." State v. Schaffer, 112 Idaho 1024, 1027, 739 P.2d 323, 326 (1987)
(factual finding that order was mailed to the parties on date indicated on the
certificate of service clearly erroneous where filing by clerk, post mark on
envelope, and actual receipt of the notice occurred one week or more later).

C.

Brady Is A Pre-Conviction Right Only, And The District Court Found No
Pre-Conviction Brady Violation

"[S]uppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the accused ...
violates due process."
added).

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (emphasis

The right to production of exculpatory evidence by the prosecution

under Brady is part of the Constitution's "fair trial guarantee." United States v.
Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628-33 (2002) (emphasis added) (Brady does not extend to
require disclosure of impeachment materials prior to entry of a guilty plea).
Under Brady, "the prosecutor is not required to deliver his entire file to defense
counsel, but only to disclose evidence favorable to the accused that, if
suppressed, would deprive the defendant of a fair trial." United States v. Bagley,
473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985) (emphasis added).

See also Kyles v. Whitely, 514

U.S. 419, 433 (1995) (Brady applies "only when suppression of the evidence
would be of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the defendant's right to
a fair trial").
Because Brady is a requirement of fair trials, it goes "too far" to conclude
that it "be extended to protect [a petitioner's] postconviction liberty interest."
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District Attorney's Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 68
(2009).

The process due in post-conviction "is not parallel to a trial right"

articulated in Brady. l5i_ Thus, "Brady is the wrong framework" for analyzing a
post-conviction petitioner's entitlement to exculpatory evidence, and states have
far more flexibility in determining what process is due. l5i_ See also Rhoades v.
State, 148 Idaho 247, 253, 220 P.3d 1066, 1072 (2009) (applying Osborne and
noting that the state constitution does not grant greater process).
The State of Idaho has provided a procedure for bringing claims of postconviction discovery of new evidence. A criminal defendant may bring a motion
for a new trial or a separate action in post-conviction based on newly discovered
evidence (evidence found after the trial and conviction). I.C. §§ 19-2406(7), 194901 (a)(4).

A motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence is,

however, "[q]uite distinct from a Brady claim." State v. Branigh, 155 Idaho 404,
421, 313 P.3d 732, 749 (Ct. App. 2013).

The remedy applicable to state

suppression of evidence after conviction is equitable tolling of time limitations to
bring a motion for new trial or a post-conviction action. Rhoades, 148 Idaho at
251,220 P.3d at 1070.
In this case the district court did not find any pre-conviction suppression of
evidence by the prosecution, only post-conviction suppression of Exhibit 14 more
than a decade after the criminal case was final.

(~, R., vol. 3, p. 136 (state

agents withheld Exhibit 14 "from at least 2003 until 2011 "). The only evidence of
pre-trial suppression of evidence was the contents of Exhibit 14, the truth of
which, the district court concluded, was "a matter of conjecture." (R., vol. 4, p.
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529.) The district court concluded that Exhibit 14 was written in 1989, 17 at least
four years after the conclusion of the trial and after the conviction was affirmed
on appeal. (R., vol. 4, pp. 557-58.) The district court erred by applying Brady to
a document that did not exist prior to trial, and therefore could not have been
suppressed under the legal standards of Brady.

Because the district court did

not find any suppression of evidence related to the trial, there was no possibility
of trial prejudice arising from suppression of evidence.
The problem with the district court's analysis is apparent.

The district

court articulated the legal standard as follows: "given this new evidence, is there
a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been
different."

(R., vol. 4,

p. 558 (emphasis altered).)

The district court

acknowledged that "in the context of this case" the task before the trial judge, had
the letter come to light in 1989, 18 would have been "looking at the new evidence"
and determining "whether he should grant a new trial." (Id.) Instead of applying
the legal test for granting a new trial based on newly discovered evidence,
however, the Court employed a Brady analysis. By granting a new trial under
Brady for actions that could not have affected the trial, the district court granted

Charboneau a windfall. Because Charboneau should only have been put back in
the position he would have been but for the purported actions of state actors, the

The state asserts that this conclusion was based on the erroneous overruling of
a hearsay objection, as discussed in section II, supra.
17

Of course because the district court specifically found suppression starting in
2003, the actual question, assuming the validity of that finding, is what the trial
court would have done had the letter been available to Charboneau in 2003.
18
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remedy should have been to put Charboneau in the position he would have been
had Exhibit 14 come to light in 2003.
Because this case involves at best post-conviction evidence, "Brady is the
wrong framework." Osborne, 557 U.S. at 69. The correct framework would have
been to apply state process for asserting a claim of newly discovered evidence. 19
Because Brady is a pre-conviction right, and the district court found only a postconviction withholding of evidence, it applied an erroneous legal standard.

D.

Even If Brady Were The Correct Legal Standard, The Factual Findings Of
The District Court Do Not Show Any Brady Violation
Even if the Brady standard were applicable, there was no Brady violation.

"To establish that a Brady violation undermines a conviction, a convicted
defendant must make each of three showings: (1) the evidence at issue is
favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory or because it is
impeaching;

(2) the

State suppressed the evidence,

either willfully or

inadvertently; and (3) prejudice ensued." Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 536
(2011) (internal quotes and ellipses omitted). Although Exhibit 14 is favorable to
the accused (in the sense that he could have moved for a new trial), the record
shows that it was neither suppressed by the State nor was there any prejudice,
as those elements are defined under Brady.

Charboneau's claim would have failed under the test applicable to newly
discovered evidence. State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 691, 551 P.2d 972, 978
(1976) (setting forth a four-part test for a new trial under newly discovered
evidence standard).
19
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1.

Exhibit 14 Was Not Suppressed By The State As Required By
Brady

Application of correct legal standards to the factual findings of the district
court shows that there was no suppression of evidence by the state. "The state,"
for purposes of this analysis, consists of "the individual prosecutor assigned to
the case" and "all of the government agents having a significant role in
investigating and prosecuting the offense."
406, 327 P.3d 372, 382 (2013).

Stevens v. State, 156 Idaho 396,

The duty to disclose does not extend to

evidence the state "does not possess" or "could not reasonably be deemed to
have imputed knowledge or control."

!.st

See also Queen v. State, 146 Idaho

502, 505, 198 P.3d 731, 734 (Ct. App. 2008) ("a prosecutor is not required to
disclose evidence the prosecutor does not possess or evidence of which the
prosecutor could not reasonably be imputed to have knowledge or control").
The factual findings of the district court do not include possession or
control of Exhibit 14 at any relevant time by "the state" as that term is defined for
purposes of Brady.

The district court made the following factual findings: (1)

"There is no evidence as to who had possession of the Tira Arbaugh letter from
1989 to December 2002." (R., vol. 3, p. 134.) (2) "There is no evidence as to
whether it was or was not delivered to Judge Becker."

(Id.)

(3)

The "Tira

Arbaugh letter arrived at ICIO between June of 2003 and September of 2003"
and was "intentionally intercepted by [prison paralegal DeWayneJ Shedd at the
direction of others."

(R., vol. 3, p. 135.)

(4) Based on "inferences and

conclusions," a Deputy Attorney General assigned to the Idaho Department of
Correction, Tim "McNeese or someone in a similar capacity directed Shedd to do
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what he did." (R., vol. 3, pp. 135-36.) The district court declined to find that Marc
Haws, the prosecutor, had anything to do with any interception of mail. (R., vol.
3, pp. 137-38.)
The only two people found by the court to have had any role in the
interception of the purported letter were a paralegal with the Department of
Correction and a Deputy Attorney General representing the Department of
Correction (R., vol. 3, pp. 135-3620 ), neither of whom qualified as a state agent
for purposes of proving a Brady violation. Stevens, 156 Idaho at 406, 327 P .3d
at 382 ("state" includes prosecutor and "government agents having a significant
role in investigating and prosecuting the offense").

The district court's factual

findings do not show the second required element a Brady violation.
The district court addressed the insufficiency of its factual findings to show
this element in two ways when granting summary judgment in Charboneau's
favor.

First, it defined the state "in broad terms, which would include both the

prosecution and the Idaho Dept. of Corrections [sic]." (R., vol. 4, p. 555.) The
district court erred by applying a legally incorrect expansion of what constitutes
"the state" for purposes of Brady. Stevens, 156 Idaho at 406, 327 P.3d at 382
(for purposes of Brady the state includes the prosecutor and "government agents
having a significant role in investigating and prosecuting the offense").
Second, it concluded that "law enforcement, by and through unknown (or
unidentified) persons, acted in concert with !DOC to suppress and conceal
exculpatory information from Charboneau." (R., vol. 4, pp. 555-56.) Put another

The finding that Shedd and McNeese intercepted Exhibit 14 is clearly
erroneous as set forth in Section E.2, infra.
20
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way:

"The letter was written and likely received by someone at the Jerome

County Courthouse at least a year before Charboneau was resentenced ....

Someone, obviously unwilling to aid the defense, obtained the letter.

It came

into the hands of employees at !DOC sometime around 2003, if not sooner, and
was deliberately concealed, apparently on instructions from those involved in
the original trial." (R., vol. 4, p. 573 (bolding added or altered).) The district court
did not make findings of fact that the prosecutor or government agents having a
significant role in the investigation and prosecution of the murder suppressed
evidence.

To the contrary, the district court specifically declined to find that

prosecutor Marc Haws suppressed any evidence. (R., vol. 3, pp. 137-38.) The
district court's supposition in summary judgment proceedings that unknown
persons other than Marc Haws "involved in the original trial" "apparently" gave
instructions leading to suppression (a supposition supported by no evidence)
does not substitute for the required finding of fact.

The district court's Brady

analysis fails because the allegedly exculpatory evidence was not found to be
suppressed

by the

prosecutor or a

government agent involved

in

the

investigation or prosecution.
2.

Any Withholding Of Exhibit 14 Was Prejudicial Under Brady

The court's analysis also fails on the third prong requiring prejudice.
"Prejudice occurs if there is a reasonable probability that, had the withheld
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have
been different." Stevens, 156 Idaho at 406, 327 P.3d at 382. The prejudice must
have "ensued" from the state's suppression of evidence.
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Because, according

to the district court's findings, the state first suppressed the evidence in 2003, the
only "proceeding" that could have potentially "been different" because of the
state's suppression of evidence was Charboneau's third post-conviction petition.
The district court's legal conclusion that there was prejudice at trial (R., vol. 4, pp.
557-59) is erroneous because such prejudice could not have "ensued" from the
suppression that the district court found happened 17 years after the end of the
trial.
Furthermore, a defendant who knows or should know about the
information cannot claim prejudice arising from its non-disclosure. United States
v. Gaggi, 811 F.2d 47, 59 (2 nd Cir. 1987) ("no Brady violation occurs if the
defendant knew or should have known the essential facts permitting him to take
advantage of any exculpatory evidence"); Fullwood v. Lee, 290 F.3d 663, 686 (4

th

Cir. 2002) (Brady rule does not compel disclosure of evidence available from
other sources); Owens v. Guida, 549 F.3d 399, 415 (6 th Cir. 2008) (no Brady
violation if the defendant "knew or should have known" of facts allowing him to
take advantage of exculpatory information); United States v. Barraza Casares,
465 F.3d 327, 334 (8 th Cir. 2006) (evidence suppressed under Brady only if it
"was otherwise unavailable to the defendant"); Pagan v. State, 29 So.3d 938,
948 (Fla. 2009) (evidence "known to the defense" cannot "be found to have been
withheld from the defendant"); Williams v. State, 7 A.3d 1038, 1050 (Md. App.
2010) (cases holding that evidence known to the defendant or his counsel is not
suppressed as that term is used in Brady "are legion"); Cronan ex rel. State v.
Cronan, 774 A.2d 866, 881 (R.I. 2001) (evidence not "suppressed" within
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meaning of Brady if the defendant "knew or should have known" the essential
facts permitting him to take advantage of any exculpatory evidence). The state
presented evidence that Charboneau, since at least 2002, has been claiming that
Tira confided to Charboneau's mother as early as during the criminal trial that her
testimony did not reflect the actual facts and that Charboneau's mother shared
this information with Charboneau and his counsel. (R., vol. 3, pp. 559-80 (order
dismissing third petition for post-conviction); R., vol. 4, pp. 247-50 (deposition Tr.,
p. 11, L. 9 - p. 23, L. 19), 251-52 (deposition Tr., p. 28, L. 7 - p. 29, L. 7), 27682; see also #29042 R., pp. 5-13 (third post-conviction petition), 35-38
(supporting affidavit).)

This uncontradicted evidence, ignored by the district

court, affirmatively disproves any alleged Brady violation, at a minimum creating
a material issue of fact.
Even if Brady were the correct rubric for analyzing an alleged postconviction withholding of evidence, the district court's factual findings do not
support the legal conclusion of a due process violation.

Because the district

court's factual findings show neither suppression by the state nor prejudice, as
those elements are defined under Brady, the district court erred by granting postconviction relief.

E.

The District Court Erred In Its Factual Findings By Shifting The Burden Of
Proof To The State And Making Clearly Erroneous Factual Findings
The district court concluded that a conspiracy of mostly unknown persons

colluded to prevent, and in fact did prevent, Charboneau from receiving
documents related to Tira and Gold. The district court admitted that to do so it
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had to leave many questions unanswered, use evidence that did not fit neatly
together,

and

make

assumptions

from

the

state's

failure

to

disprove

Charboneau's allegations. (R., vol. 3, pp. 139-40; vol. 4, p. 527 n.4.) By doing
this the district court relieved Charboneau of the burden of proving his claims,
made several clearly erroneous factual findings, and erroneously concluded
Charboneau was entitled to post-conviction relief.
1.

The District Court Erred When It Concluded That Charboneau Met
His Burden Of Proving His Claim That The "Packet" Of Documents
Was Assembled By Shedd Or Some Other Unknown Person
Involved In A Conspiracy To Keep Documents Away From
Charboneau

"Petitions for post-conviction relief are civil proceedings governed by the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure." Pizzuto v. State, 149 Idaho 155, 159, 233 P.3d
86, 90 (2010). The "petitioner must prove by a preponderance of the evidence
the allegations upon which the request for post-conviction relief is based." State
v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386,

348 P.3d 1, 95-96 (2014). See also Klein v.

State, 16 Idaho 792, 796, 331 P.3d 534, 538 (Ct. App. 2014) ("the petitioner must
prove by a preponderance of evidence the allegations upon which the request for
post-conviction relief is based"). It is error to shift the burden of proof to a party
who does not bear it. Frontier Development Group, LLC v. Caravella, 157 Idaho
589, 598, 338 P.3d 1193, 1202 (2014) (error to shift the burden of proof and
putting the responding party in the position of "proving a negative"); Jensen v.
Jensen, 128 Idaho 600, 605, 917 P.2d 757, 762 (1996).
The district court violated these standards by relieving Charboneau of the
burden of proving his claim that the "packet" of documents (Exhibits 1-14) was
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compiled by Shedd or some other unknown member of an amorphous
conspiracy, and instead shifting the burden of proof to the state. It acknowledged
that its factual resolution of the evidence left "many questions ... unresolved" and
that "many parts of this evidentiary puzzle ... do not fit neatly together." (R., vol.
3, p. 140.) The "forgeries and false emails" among the documents, the district
court stated, create a "monstrous puzzle." (R., vol. 4, p. 527 n.4.) The court felt
that resolving at least some of these questions and puzzles against the state,
however, was appropriate "[a]bsent some evidence as to when or how
Charboneau could possibly have manufactured Ex. 4 and obtained Shedd's
signature on it, and placed all these documents in the unit office for Hiskett to
find, and HOPEFULLY deliver."

(R, vol. 3, pp. 139-40 (emphasis original).)

Review of the evidence under the correct, non-shifted, burden of proof shows
that Charboneau did not prove his allegations.
To review the "packet" of documents is to understand that it has only two
reasons for existing: to establish Charboneau's claims asserted in the third (and
current) post-conviction petition and to show that he should be found to have
timely raised those claims. 21 Taking the documents in the order of the dates that
appear on them:

9/06/89

Exhibit 14.

A document containing what is apparently the

handwriting of Tira. The document is a multi-generational copy, meaning it is a

The state is not here conceding or relying on the truth asserted in any of the
documents in the "packet." On the contrary, there is ample reason to believe that
several documents have been forged or altered (even in addition to the three
forgeries found by the district court) and it is the state's position that all the
documents constitute hearsay.
21
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copy of a copy of a copy, etc. In the copy presented the declarant claims that
Tira provided false information and observed the hiding of evidence at the behest
of police officers and

prosecutors.

Charboneau's expert admitted that

"photocopies can be manipulated." (Evid. Tr., p. 348, Ls. 3-4.) "[Y]ou can take [a
document] and photocopy it and delete and add different types of items on one
generation" and the alteration would be harder to detect in future generations.
(Evid. Tr., p. 361, L. 14 - p. 362, L. 9.) Thus, although it contains what appears
to be Tira's handwriting, nothing excludes the possibility of alteration of this
document.
In a post-script the declarant averred to being in "Bruneau Idaho for a
cowboy benefit & street dance where Pinto Bennett's band is providing the
music" and that the declarant "talked with Pinto" who "convinced me to write" the
document.

(Exhibit 14 (Exhibits Part 1, at p. 128).) This document could not

have come into existence in the manner described therein because there was no
street dance in Bruneau on the date set forth on the letter. (R., vol. 4, pp. 69-92
(Bruneau street dance was held ten days after date on letter).) In addition, Tira
was married by that time, living in Nevada, and did not have access to a car ..
(Evid. Tr., p. 453, L. 7 - p.455, L. 15; p. 467, Ls. 11-14.) Either Tira was lying, or
there was some alteration to this document.

9/07/89 Exhibit 5A. An envelope addressed to Judge Becker with a return
name of Tira Arbaugh at her parents' address, and a postmark of September 7,
1989, Bruneau, Idaho. With the uncontroverted evidence that changes on copies
can be easily hidden by recopying, the state showed it would be easy for anyone
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to put a new address and return address on a copy of an envelope with a
genuine postmark. (R, vol. 3, pp. 73-93; Exhibits, part 2, pp. 465-67, 499-502
(Severe Depo. Tr., p. 85, L. 15 - p. 93, L. 15; Exhibit 5).)

Charboneau's

grandfather lived in Bruneau (Evid. Tr., p. 158, Ls. 6-8), so it is likely that he or
other family members had access to envelopes with genuine postmarks.

5/18/01

Exhibit 7B. Documentation of checking out law books from the

!SCI (the prison in Boise) resource center to pursue a claim of "actual innocence"
based on "the letter that [Charboneau] received from the Sheriff." This document
on its face shows efforts by Charboneau in May of 2001 to bring the claims he
would eventually bring in the third petition for post-conviction relief.

6/03/01 Exhibit 7E. Document allegedly signed by ex-sheriff Larry Gold,
used as a basis for the third petition. Charboneau testified that this was the letter
referenced in Exhibit 7B, and that he checked out books to pursue a claim based
on it about two weeks before receiving the letter because his mother and friends
Tina Venable and Lynn Martin had been in contact with Gold and informed
Charboneau a letter would be forthcoming. (Evid. Tr., p. 137, L. 16 - p. 143, L.
7.)

6/17/01

Exhibits 7A and 9.

Respectively a concern form to the !SCI

paralegal, Ms. Davis, and an access to courts request. The yellow copy would
have been Charboneau's (although part of that is covered by the exhibit sticker)
indicating that this was a document actually in Charboneau's possession in 2001.

6/18/01

Exhibit 3.

An !SCI resource document originally attached to a

packet of forms to file a state habeas corpus action. Charboneau admitted that
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he received this original document with the packet. (Evid.
145, L. 8.)
possession.

, p. 144, L. 6 - p.

Charboneau offered no explanation for how this document left his
The most obvious answer is that Charboneau himself put this

document in the envelope (Exhibit 1) with the other documents that form the
"packet."

11 /05/01 Exhibit 10. An !SCI access to courts request.
11/06/01

Exhibit ?F.

Front page only of a petition for writ of habeas

corpus with a filing stamp of November 6, 2001.

11/13/01 Exhibit 8. Second document apparently signed by Larry Gold.
As set forth below in more detail, this document is dated a year before
Charboneau's transfer to ICIO (Orofino prison) where Shedd worked as the
paralegal. Charboneau offered no evidence of how this letter would have been
intercepted by Shedd. (See generally R., vol. 3; Evid. Tr.)

12/30/01

Exhibit 6.

Envelope from federal district court addressed to

Charboneau.
Several significant events occur between December 30, 2001, and
December 5, 2002, the date on the next sequential document in the "packet." On
May 3, 2002, Charboneau filed his third petition for post-conviction relief based
on the first Gold document (Exhibit ?E) and claimed that Tira Arbaugh had
informed Charboneau's family that she had provided false testimony under
pressure. (#29042 R., pp. 5-14.) The petition was dismissed on September 30,
2002. (#29042 R., pp. 90-92.)
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On November 24, 2002, Charboneau was transferred to ICIO (Orofino),
where Shedd worked as a paralegal. (Evid. Tr., p. 158, Ls. 9-11; p. 266, Ls. 1516.)

This necessarily means that Shedd could not have intercepted any

documents intended for Charboneau prior to this time. Exhibit 7E, the document
bearing what appears to be Larry Gold's signature dated June 3, 2001, was
presented in relation to Charboneau's third post-conviction petition (#29042 R., p.
48), and was obviously not intercepted. Any finding that Shedd (or anyone else)
intercepted Exhibit 8, the document bearing what appears to be Larry Gold's
signature dated November 13, 2001, is unsupported by any evidence.
Furthermore, to the extent the district court concluded that Shedd
gathered the documents related to Charboneau's efforts to raise the claims
asserted in the third petition, such is clear error. First, Shedd had no motive to
gather documentary evidence that would assist Charboneau to claim that he
made reasonable efforts to bring his post-conviction claims in a timely manner
while Charboneau obviously would. Moreover, Exhibit 3 is an original document
that Charboneau obtained in conjunction with forms to bring a habeas corpus
claim.

Charboneau presented no evidence how this document got out of his

possession and into Shedd's. The only possible conclusion from the evidence is
that the compiler of the packet was Charboneau.
12/05/02 Exhibit 7.

Envelope with Charboneau's name, inmate number

and a notation to "forward to ICIO." There is a notation on the back, "Recieved
[sic] 01/06/03 A. DeWayne Shedd." Nothing in this exhibit is inconsistent with the
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normal processing of "transport mail" (mail forwarded or delivered within IDOC
with the transportation of prisoners). (Evid.

6/27/03

Exhibit 4.

, p. 276, L. 3 - p. 277,

22.)

Handwritten document purporting to memorialize

instructions from Deputy Attorney General Tim McNeese to DeWayne Shedd to
monitor Charboneau's mail and seize any letter from Larry Gold or documents
"depicting the name Tira Arbaugh."

9/23/03 Exhibit 1. Envelope that Corporal Hiskett handed Charboneau.
The date appears with the apparent signature of A. DeWayne Shedd on back.
The front contains two notations, "Charboneau #22091

C-2" and "Legal

Documents." Like Exhibit 7, nothing in this exhibit is inconsistent with the normal
processing of "transport mail."

11/14/04

Exhibit 7C.

Printout of what appears to be an e-mail from

DeWayne Shedd to William Unger (in response to a prior email from Unger to
Shedd).

The district court found, on the basis of overwhelming evidence, that

this document is a forgery. (R., vol. 3, pp. 138-40; vol. 4, p. 527 n.4.)
11/15/04

Exhibit 7D.

Printout of what appears to be an e-mail from

Dewayne Shedd to William Unger (in response to a prior email from Unger to
Shedd).

The district court found, on the basis of overwhelming evidence, that

this document is a forgery. (R., vol. 3, pp. 138-40; vol. 4, p. 527 n.4.)
Undated Exhibit 5.

Document purporting to be a declaration that Court

Clerk Cheryl Watts had the original letter purportedly written by Tira Arbaugh and
sent to Judge Becker.

It bears what appears to be the signature of former
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Jerome County Sherriff Deputy, Orville Balzer. 22 The district court found, based
on the parties' stipulation, that this document is a forgery. (R., vol. 3, p. 126.)
Exhibits 4, 5, 7C and 7D are all, on their face, evidence that Court Clerk
Cheryl Watts, Shedd, McNeese, and Unger were working to and did in fact
intercept documents related to Tira Arbaugh and Larry Gold.

Three of these

documents (Exhibits 5, 7C and 70) are known forgeries. The district court's
conclusion that Exhibit 4 is genuine is contrary to the evidence and thus clearly
erroneous. Regardless, whoever was compiling these documents was compiling
evidence consisting of wholly or mostly forged documents to benefit Charboneau
in relation to the claims he asserted in his third (and, ultimately, present) petition.
The Idaho Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of the third petition on
November 23, 2004.
(2004).

Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 102 P.3d 1108

The case was remanded and attorney Greg Fuller appeared on

Charboneau's behalf.

(#32120 R., pp. 2 (notice of appearance was filed on

3/15/05), 19 (order discharging attorney Greg Fuller on April 29, 2005).)
5/03/05

Exhibit 2.

Concern form by Charboneau requesting Shedd to

check mail logs from January to April 29, 2005, to determine if attorney Greg
Fuller had sent him mail. Shedd responded that such logs would be kept in the
mail room and Charboneau should check there. Notably, the document purports
that this is the original concern form which was returned to Charboneau. (Exhibit
2 (noting that white original was to be returned to the offender).)

Deputy Balzer testified at Charboneau's criminal trial. (Trial Tr., vol. 4, p. 979,
Ls. 8-24.)

22
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The district court dismissed Charboneau's third petition (for the second
time) on July 12, 2005.

(#32120 R., pp. 43-64.)

Charboneau's appointed

counsel filed a notice of appeal on July 19, 2005. (#32120 R., pp. 99-03.)
1/19/06

Exhibit 11.

Copy of letter purportedly to attorney Greg Silvey

from Charboneau regarding the brief he filed on Charboneau's behalf on appeal.
Greg Silvey represented Charboneau on the appeal of his third petition.
Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900,901,174 P.3d 870,872 (2008).
Shedd was transferred from ICIO to SIC! in Boise in May of 2007. 23 (Evid.
Tr., p. 266, Ls. 15-20.)

The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of

Charboneau's third petition on January 8, 2008. Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho
900, 174 P.3d 870 (2008).
3/31/08 Exhibit 12. Copy of letter apparently to Idaho Attorney General

Lawrence Wasden complaining that on March 28, 2008, the prison staff
interfered with Charboneau's ability to file an appeal from a dismissal of his fourth
post-conviction case. (Docket number 35193.)
The documents (Exhibits 2-14) were found in a single envelope with
Charboneau's name on it (Exhibit 1) in the guard station next to the day room on
Charboneau's tier on March 18, 2011, and delivered to Charboneau. (Evid. Tr.,
p. 21, L. 1 - p. 25, L. 5; p. 68, L. 19- p. 69, L. 21; p. 179, L. 25- p. 181, L. 2; p.

How the "packet" migrated from Shedd's office in another part of the building to
the guardroom almost four years after Shedd left is one of the mysteries
unresolved by any evidence. However, the evidence does show that Charboneau
was at ICIO and apparently still in possession of at least some of the documents
in the "packet" from 2007 through 2011.
23
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186, Ls. 21-25; p. 487, L. 3 - p. 488, L. 19; p. 492, L. 4 - p. 495, L. 18; p. 497, L.
15 - p. 498, L. 2; p. 528, L. 7 - p. 530, L.
Far from showing that Shedd collected these documents, the evidence
shows he could not have.

The dates on nine of the documents precede

Charboneau's transfer to ICIO where Shedd was working.
document is dated after Shedd left ICIO.

At least one

Several of the documents were

documents actually in Charboneau's possession, with no evidence of where,
when, why or how Shedd obtained them from Charboneau. In addition, several
of the documents are known forgeries created for the sole purpose of providing
evidence of Charboneau's claims as asserted in the third and current petitions for
post-conviction relief.

The only viable suspect for who collected these

documents is Charboneau himself.
That Charboneau collected the documents in the packet including Exhibit
14 is further bolstered by evidence that his family members knew about and took
action in relation to Exhibit 14 before March 18, 2011.

Frederick Bennett, a

friend of Charboneau's family, testified that at the request of someone associated
with Charboneau he signed an affidavit on February 3, 2011. (R., vol. 4, p. 213
(Bennet Depa. Tr., p. 25, L. 11 - p. 28, L. 20).) That affidavit states he received
a copy of a seven-page letter written by Tira Arbaugh "before she mailed it to
Philip Becker, Fifth District Judge."

(R., vol. 4, p. 238.)

Although Bennett

claimed the contents of the affidavit were not true (R., vol. 4, pp. 213-14 (Bennet
Depo. Tr., p. 28, L. 21 - p. 29, L. 10)), someone associated with Charboneau
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knew about Exhibit 14 at least 43 days before Corporal Hiskett delivered the
packet of documents to Charboneau.
Likewise, on February 21, 2011, 18 days before Charboneau acquired the
envelope full of documents from Corporal Hiskett, Charboneau's mother, Betsy
Charboneau, wrote a letter to Jerome County Prosecutor John Horgan in which
she stated she "just recently learned that Tira also confessed this information"the same information she had told Betsy several years previously-"in a letter
that she had written to Judge Becker." (R., vol. 3, p. 294.) Tira wrote the letter in
1989, according to Betsy Charboneau, the same date that appears on Exhibit 14.
(Id.) Betsy wrote another letter to Deputy Rick Cowan on March 9, 2011, two
days before Charboneau claims he first gained possession of Exhibit 14. (R.,
vol. 4, p. 297.)

In the letter she claimed she had a "happenstance encounter"

with a man who said "he was in possession of a copy of a letter that Tira Arbaugh
had written to Judge Becker in 1989," and promised more information "in the
near future." (R., vol. 4, p. 300.) The record establishes that two people close to
Charboneau created written statements detailing knowledge of the existence of
Exhibit 14 days and weeks before that document was purportedly handed to
Charboneau by Corporal Hiskett.
Interpreting all this evidence as proving Charboneau's claims leaves
"many questions .. . unresolved" because the evidence does "not fit neatly
together," while the "forgeries and false" evidence create a "monstrous puzzle."
(R., vol. 3, p. 140; vol. 4, p. 527 n.4.) There are no unresolved mysteries created
by concluding that Charboneau, with the help of family and friends, gathered the
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documents in the packet, forging several of them. Only by shifting to the state
the burden of proof of the questions left unanswered by Charboneau's theory did
the district court rule in Charboneau's favor. (R., vol. 3, pp. 139-40.) Applying
the correct standard shows that Charboneau did not meet his burden of proof.
2.

The Evidence Does Not Support A Finding That Charboneau's Mail
Was Intercepted

The only evidence in the record even purporting to show that Shedd
successfully intercepted Exhibits 8 and 14 are two printouts of emails (Exhibits
7C and 7D) that are known forgeries.

The district court's factual findings that:

(1) "Someone sent or delivered [Exhibit 14] to Charboneau ... sometime between
December 2002 and September 2003"; (2) Exhibit 14 "arrived at ICIO between
June of 2003 and September of 2003"; (3) "It was mailed or addressed to
Charboneau"; and (4) "It was intentionally intercepted by Shedd at the direction
of others" (R., vol. 3, pp. 134-35 (emphasis original)) are not supported by any
evidence. These findings are clearly erroneous.
Not only is there no evidence supporting these findings, the contrary
evidence is legion. When mail at ICIO arrives, a guard opens the mail crates to
make sure they are safe and then takes them to central control. (Exhibits part 1,
p. 398 (Layne Depa. Tr., p. 39, Ls. 12-17); p. 944 (Unger Depa. Tr., p. 69, L. 15 p. 70, L. 22).) Another officer stamps the mail received and then processes it by
opening it, inspecting it for contraband, and sorting it by cell block. (Exhibits part
1, p. 398 (Layne Depa. Tr., p. 39, Ls. 17-24), p. 944 (Unger Depa. Tr., p. 70, L.
23 - p. 71, L. 3).) Another officer on a different shift again checks the mail then
delivers it when offenders, notified they have mail, come to the tier office.
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(Exhibits part 1., p. 399 (Layne Depo. Tr., p. 40, Ls. 1-20), p. 945-96 (Unger
Depo. Tr., p. 74, L. 12 - p. 78, L. 23).) Shedd, a paralegal, played no role in this
process.

(Evid. Tr., p. 268, Ls. 1-7.)

He would had to have organized

"somewhere around twenty people" to maintain a conspiracy to intercept certain
documents coming to an inmate through the mail. (Exhibits part 1, p. 323 (Carlin
Depa. Tr., p. 60, Ls. 1-24).) There is no evidence that Shedd could have, much
less did, create such an organization.
The district court's factual findings that Exhibits 8 and 14 were sent to
Charboneau and intercepted by Shedd in a particular range of time are clearly
erroneous and constitute reversible error.

F.

Conclusion
The district court's finding of a Brady violation fails for three reasons.

First, the Brady doctrine requires the state to disclose exculpatory evidence in its
possession prior to trial, and does not govern access to exculpatory evidence
after a final conviction.

The Brady doctrine therefore did not apply to

Charboneau's claims of suppression of evidence after the trial.
Second, even if the Brady doctrine were the correct legal standard, its
application to the facts found shows no Brady violation. Specifically, the district
court found suppression only by correctional authorities, not any prosecutor or
law enforcement officer who investigated the case as required under Brady. In
addition the findings of the court do not support a conclusion that post-trial
suppression of a document that did not even exist at the time of trial could
possibly have adversely affected the outcome of the trial.
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Third, the district court's factual findings rely on shifting the burden of
proof to the state and assuming dates and actions without any evidentiary
support. No reasonable view of the evidence supports the court's findings Shedd
could have, much less did, intercept specific documents in a specific range of
time.

For any or all of these reasons the district court's judgment should be

reversed and Charboneau's petition dismissed with prejudice.

IV.
The District Court Erred When It Based Its Factual Findings On Evidence It
Determined Was Inadmissible But That It Investigated And Considered Ex Parle
A.

Introduction
During cross-examination of Marc Haws at the evidentiary hearing,

Charboneau's counsel asked about Mr. Haws' "prosecution of Mr. Paradis."
(Evid. Tr., p. 436, Ls. 10-12.) The state objected on relevance grounds. (Evid.
Tr., p. 436, Ls. 13-14.)

Charboneau's counsel represented that he wished to

"ask Mr. Haws if he was involved in any kind of concealment of exculpatory
evidence from the Paradis prosecution." (Evid. Tr., p. 436, Ls. 15-18.) The state
expanded its objection to include I.R.E. 403 and 404(b). (Evid. Tr., p. 436, Ls.
19-20.)

Counsel for Charboneau stated he believed Haws was involved in a

Brady violation in the Paradis case and wanted to "inquire whether [Haws] was
involved in similar conduct in the Charboneau case." (Evid. Tr., p. 436, L. 23 - p.
437, L. 2.) The judge asked, "Isn't this just an offer of propensity evidence, did it
once, did it twice?"
responded, "Yes."

(Evid. Tr., p. 437, Ls. 7-8.)

(Evid. Tr., p. 437, L. 9.)
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Charboneau's counsel

The district court sustained the

objection. (Evid. Tr., p. 438, Ls. 4-5.) Because of that ruling, no evidence related
to that topic was introduced by either party. (See generally Evid. Tr.)
Despite excluding all evidence regarding Mr. Haws' prosecution of Mr.
Paradis, the district court in its findings of fact and its order granting summary
judgment repeatedly refers to the facts of the Paradis case. (R., vol. 3, p. 137;
R., vol. 4, p. 542.)

The district court erred by conducting an extra-judicial

investigation into the facts of the Paradis case and considering on an ex parte
basis evidence it ruled inadmissible.

B.

Standard Of Review
"Due process issues are generally questions of law."

Idaho Historic

Preservation Council v. City of Council of the City of Boise, 134 Idaho 651, 654, 8
P.3d 646, 649 (2000).

C.

The District Court Erred When It Based Its Findings And Conclusions
Upon Evidence Excluded From The Hearing As Inadmissible
A basic requirement of a fair trial is that the "verdict must be based upon

the evidence developed at the trial."

Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472

(1965) Uury verdict in criminal trial tainted because deputies with charge of jury
were also key witnesses at trial); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961) Uurors
exposed to extensive pre-trial information not unbiased). Failing to "confine its
decision to the record produced at the public hearing ... violates procedural due
process of law." Idaho Historic Preservation Council, 134 Idaho at 654, 8 P.3d at
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649. 24 A decision that "deviates from the public record" is "essentially ... a
second fact-gathering session without proper notice, a clear violation of due
process," because it deprives a party of the "opportunity to rebut any evidence"
received outside the record.

!ft

Findings "based on matters outside the record

must be reversed as unsupported by substantial, competent evidence or as
arbitrary and capricious." Laurino v. Board of Professional Discipline, 137 Idaho
596, 601, 51 P.3d 410, 415 (2002). See also Roll v. City of Middleton, 115 Idaho
833, 837, 771 P.2d 54, 58 (Ct. App. 1989) (where jury has had improper ex parte
communications verdict must be vacated if "prejudice reasonably could have
occurred").
Although the judge ruled at the hearing that evidence regarding any Brady
claim in the Paradis case was inadmissible (Evid. Tr., p. 436, L. 10 - p. 438, L. 5),
in making its ruling it relied on the facts underlying the Paradis case as evidence
favorable to Charboneau (R., vol. 3, p. 137; R., vol. 4, p. 542). The district court
necessarily conducted its own extrajudicial investigation into the facts of the

Paradis case because no such evidence was put on the record, having been
ruled inadmissible by the district court. By considering inadmissible evidence it
gathered outside of the record the district court committed reversible error.

The Court was applying the standard applicable to a "governing body" sitting in
a "quasi-judicial capacity". Idaho Historic Preservation Council, 134 Idaho at
654, 8 P.3d at 649. This standard, not surprisingly, also applies "to courts."
Eacret v. Bonner County, 139 Idaho 780, 784, 86 P.3d 494, 498 (2004).
24
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V.

The District Court Erred By Admitting And Considering Evidence Of Prior Bad
Acts As Proof Of Actions In Conformity With Character
A.

Introduction
Tim McNeese was a Deputy Attorney General who represented the Idaho

Department of Correction between 1984 and 2006. (Evid. Tr., p. 439, Ls. 9-22.)
During cross-examination Charboneau's counsel inquired about whether Mr.
McNeese had been sanctioned in "the Gomez case." (Evid. Tr., p. 442, Ls. 1721; p. 443, Ls 19-20; p. 444, Ls. 11-12.) The state objected, in part on the basis
of I.RE. 404(b).

(Evid. Tr., p. 443, Ls. 21-22; p. 444, Ls. 11-14.) The district

court overruled the objection. (Evid. Tr., p. 444, Ls. 15-20.) Likewise, during the
testimony of Dewayne Shedd, the prison paralegal, the district court made the
same ruling, concluding the evidence did not show character but instead showed
only "a similar event" of confiscation of inmate documents "during the course of
his employment." (Evid. Tr., p. 247, L. 6 - p. 249, L. 21.) It then considered the
Gomez case in relation to both Shedd's and McNeese's alleged acts in this case.
(R., vol. 3, pp. 120, 137.)

The district court erred because evidence of the

conduct of McNeese and Shedd in relation to the Gomez case was not relevant
for any proper purpose.

B.

Standard Of Review
Whether evidence is relevant is a question of law reviewed de nova.

State v. Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816, 819, 864 P.2d 654, 657 (Ct. App. 1993)
(citations omitted). However, the abuse of discretion standard applies to the
district court's determination that the probative value of the evidence is not
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substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 51,
205 P.3d 1185, 1187 (2009).

C.

Evidence Of The Conduct Of Shedd And McNeese In Relation To The
Gomez Case Was Irrelevant To Any Proper Purpose
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the

character of a person in an attempt to show he or she acted in conformity with
that character.
(2009).

State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52, 205 P.3d 1185, 1188

However, such evidence is admissible for other purposes, including

proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident. I.RE. 404(b); State v. Phillips, 123 Idaho 178,
845 P.2d 1211 (1993); State v. Gauna, 117 Idaho 83, 87, 785 P.2d 647, 651 (Ct.
App. 1989). Evidence of prior bad acts is admissible if (a) it is relevant to prove
some issue other than the person's character, and (b) its probative value for the
proper purpose is not substantially outweighed by the probability of unfair
prejudice associated with character. State v. Cross, 132 Idaho 667, 670, 978
P.2d 227, 230 (1999). The second prong of this test only excludes evidence if
the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value. State
v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 275-76, 77 P.3d 956, 964-65 (2003).
At the hearing, the district court, over the state's objection, allowed the
admission of evidence that McNeese had been sanctioned by a court for
acquiring a letter supplied to him by Shedd (who found it in the law library) that
was ultimately found to be covered by the attorney-client privilege. (Evid. Tr., p.
442, L. 17 - p. 446, L. 19.) Charboneau's counsel did not articulate, nor did the
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district court find, that the evidence was relevant to any issue other than proving
actions in conformity with character. The evidence is cited rather prominently by
the district court in the evidence related to Shedd (R., vol. 3, p. 120) and also is
mentioned in relation to McNeese as evidence of whether he was involved in
suppressing Exhibit 14 (R., vol. 3, p. 137). Again, the district court articulated no
issue other than conformance with character for which this evidence was
considered. Because this evidence was not relevant to any issue but propensity,
and was in fact considered as propensity evidence by the district court, the
district court erred.

VI.

The State Requests An Order Allowing It To Immediately Take Charboneau Into
Custody
The district court ordered that Charboneau be released upon posting
$20,000 cash or surety bond. (R., vol. 4, p. 660.) It put no conditions on the
bond or release.

(Id.) The state requests that if any reversible error is found,

that this right to bond be vacated.
Moreover, the state requests that bond be immediately revoked upon
issuance of an opinion and the state's authority to take Charboneau into custody
reinstated without delay. This Court's opinion would not become final for at least
21 days following issuance of its opinion. I.AR. 38(b). The state submits that
giving Charboneau 21 days' notice that his bond will be revoked creates an
undue risk of flight, even if the matter is remanded for further proceedings but
especially if this Court concludes that he is not entitled to post-conviction relief.
Thus, the state requests this Court to exercise its plenary jurisdiction and order
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that the bond provision in the judgment be vacated and that Charboneau be
brought back into custody either before or immediately upon issuance of its
opinion. See Izaguirre v. R&L Carriers Shared Services, LLC, 155 Idaho 229,
232, 308 P .3d 929, 932 (2013) (Court may exercise plenary jurisdiction to reach
issues outside appellate rules).

CONCLUSION
The state requests that the district court's judgment be reversed and that
Charboneau's petition be dismissed with prejudice. In the alternative, the state
requests that the case be remanded for further proceedings before a different
district judge.
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